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I. INTRODUCTION
Much has been written recently about the value of comparative analysis
in constitutional decision-making. Most of this literature begins with the
t Associate Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law; Visiting Research Fellow, Law
Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University (2002-2003). My initial
thinking about this topic was greatly assisted by comments from David Gerber and Patrick Glenn. I am
also grateful for comments from David Fontana, participants in the comparative constitutionalism panel
at the 2002 Law and Society Meeting, particularly Harry Arthurs, Sujit Choudry, David Schneiderman,
and Mark Tushnet, and participants in workshops at Chicago-Kent College of Law and the Faculty of
Law at the University of New South Wales. My colleagues at the Australian National University,
particularly Christos Mantziaris and Adrienne Stone, were very helpful in the final stages of writing.
Finally, I am immensely grateful for the wonderful research assistance of Eric Bourget, Jon Neuleib, and
Zoe Guest.
1. See Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REv. 771 (1997);
Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative
Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999); David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in
Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539 (2001); Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and
Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up the Conversation on "Proportionality, " Rights and
Federalism, I U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583 (1999); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative
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observation that, in the past few decades, other nations have enacted
constitutions that have been influenced to varying degrees by the U.S.
Constitution. The courts charged with interpreting those constitutions have
freely looked to American and other foreign jurisprudence for guidance. The
U.S. Supreme Court, on the other hand, has generally ignored constitutional
developments in other countries. As Judge Calabresi so incisively noted, the
U.S. Supreme Court has so far failed to "learn from [its] children."
2
Nonetheless, a few U.S. Supreme Court Justices3 have called for greater
openness to foreign decisions, particularly in the context of constitutional
issues dealing with human rights concerns such as the death penalty.4 The
broad recognition and application of principles protecting human rights and
liberties make such issues particularly well-suited to a transnational analysis.
5
Aside from this burst of interest in comparative constitutional law,6 there is
little literature on the nature of comparative judicial reasoning more generally.
Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter and a handful of others have written about
when, why, and how courts engage in transnational communication,7 but
questions about the appropriateness and effects of comparative analyses in
judicial decision-making remain relatively unexamined. In some respects it is
odd that the bulk of thinking on these issues has occurred in constitutional
law. Comparativists have traditionally focused on private rather than public
law,8 and one would expect judges to reflect this practice by thinking about
Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999).
2. United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
3. See, e.g., William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts-Comparative Remarks, in GERMANY
AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST PRESENT AND FUTURE-A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411, 412 (Paul
Kirchof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993) ("[N]ow that constitutional law is solidly grounded in so
many countries, it is time that the United States courts begin looking to the decisions of other
constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative process."). But see Atkins v. Virginia, 306 U.S. 304,
321 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (explicitly calling attention to the "defects in the Court's
decision to place weight on foreign laws").
4. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (2002) (Stevens, J.) (citing the opinion of the
"world community" that "executing the mentally retarded is wrong"); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990,
993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citing law from a variety of foreign
jurisdictions).
5. But see Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational
Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499 (2000) (expressing
skepticism about the value of transnational discussions or comparative reasoning in the area of human
rights).
6. In addition to the increasing interest in comparative constitutional law, there is a
significant increase in both comparative and international course work in American law schools. See
Mary Kay Kane, President's Message: Teaching and Scholarship in a World Without Borders, AALS
NEWSLETTER, Nov. 2001, http://www.aals.org/pmnov01.html.
7. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transnational Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REv.
99 (1994) (discussing different forms of transnational judicial dialogue and the importance of such
dialogue to the judiciary as an institution); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J.
INT'L L. 1103 (2000) (discussing the emergence of a global legal community through judicial dialogue);
see also, e.g., Choudhry, supra note 1 (discussing comparative approaches to constitutional law);
Tushnet, supra note I (discussing how U.S. courts might use the constitutional experiences of other
nations in interpreting the Constitution); see also, e.g., Patrick McFadden, Provincialism in United
States Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 4 (1995) (commenting on the embarrassing absence of foreign and
international law in cases that involve the interests of other nations); Eric Stein, Uses, Misuses-And
Nonuses of Comparative Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 198 (1977) (discussing the importance to lawmakers
of studying foreign legal options).
8. In fact, it is interesting to note that many of the comparative constitutional scholars in the
United States are first and foremost constitutional scholars who have developed an interest in
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foreign law in private law issues before incorporating it in constitutional
cases. But questions remain: What are the larger ramifications of adopting a
comparative approach to judicial reasoning? Is there room for more foreign
law in judicial reasoning?
At first glance, the answers would probably be no. Legal systems reflect
the cultures within which they are situated and thus have unique and highly
contingent identities. In particular, the organic quality of the common law
firmly embeds it in local norms and customs. The interdependency between
law and the culture within which it is situated is indeed one of the defming
features of the common law, and is crucial to its ongoing vitality. Given this
close connection between law and local culture, foreign law seems to have
very little place in judicial reasoning. And yet, as borders between cultures are
porous, should the borders between legal systems not be equally porous?
Many have written about the interdependency of legal systems over time
and the porous nature of the boundaries between legal systems.9 Most
recently, Professor Patrick Glenn has written eloquently and convincingly
about "reconciling legal traditions. ' '  And, as already noted, there is a
growing body of literature on sharing constitutional law and norms. But most
of this material focuses on the development of law itself. By contrast, this
Article explores how a comparative approach to decision-making fits within
or even influences a larger model of judicial reasoning and examines the pros
and cons of such a model. There is no better place to examine these questions
than in the attitudes and jurisprudence of the Supreme Courts of Canada and
the United States.
The U.S. and Canadian legal systems, including the Supreme Courts of
both countries, share many common characteristics. As followers of the
common law tradition," they adhere to similar interpretations of the rule of
law, follow similar procedural and evidentiary rules, and believe strongly in
the concept of stare decisis. 12 Both Courts also adhere to a robust notion of
judicial review. But unlike its U.S. counterpart, the Supreme Court of Canada
consistently looks to the law of other nations for guidance and inspiration.' 3 In
fact, the Supreme Court of Canada's use of foreign law has not diminished
with the establishment of a uniquely Canadian body of law, but rather has
comparative inquiry-for example, Mark Tushnet, Bruce Ackerman, and Vicki Jackson-rather than the
reverse-comparative scholars with an interest in constitutional issues.
9. Perhaps the most well known of such works is ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN
APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1974); see also Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform,
92 LAW Q. REV. 79 (1976) (discussing the centrality of legal transplants to legal change).
10. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW
318-38 (2000) [hereinafter GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS) (examining the interdependency of law and
legal systems over time); see also H. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 MCGILL L.J. 261 (1987)
(discussing the "reception" of foreign law).
11. The Supreme Court of Canada also adheres to the civil law tradition in its review of cases
emerging out of Quebec, a civil law jurisdiction.
12. Arguably, neither jurisdiction really follows the doctrine of stare decisis. See H. Patrick
Glenn, The Common Law in Canada, 74 CAN. B. REV. 261, 268-71 (1995).
13. Glenn, Persuasive Authority, supra note 10, at 294 (noting that in Canada the openness to
foreign sources increased in the latter half of the 20th century). However, Canada did unsuccessfully
attempt to turn inward and shut out foreign influences around the end of the 19th century. See G. Blaine
Baker, The Reconstitution of Upper Canadian Legal Thought in the Late-Victorian Empire, 3 LAW &
HIST. REV. 219 (1985).
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increased in frequency and diversity. The U.S. Supreme Court, on the other
hand, has focused on the formation of a highly autonomous national legal
system. 4 The use of foreign law in the past few decades by the Supreme
Court of Canada is most prominent in the area of human rights, leading
Professor Kent Greenawalt to comment that Canadian courts have attempted
to give "meaning to liberties that transcend national boundaries."' 5 But the
Supreme Court of Canada by no means limits the influence of foreign law to
such cases. Foreign law appears in the entire range of cases that fall within the
Court's jurisdiction.
The premise of this Article is that these separate and distinct attitudes to
foreign law cannot be understood or critiqued in isolation-that such attitudes
should be looked at and assessed in conjunction with other elements of
judicial reasoning. When looked at in this broader context, it becomes
possible to link, at least conceptually, perceptions about foreign authority and
local authority. In other words, the rejection of foreign law by the U.S.
Supreme Court is justified, at least partially, by reasons that also help explain
its concerns about authority within the American legal system. Its isolationism
(at least compared to the Supreme Court of Canada) can be seen as a response
to both local and global influences.
Similarly, the openness of the Supreme Court of Canada to foreign
authority can be linked to its slightly more ambiguous attitude toward its
authority within the Canadian legal system. The notion of "dialogue," which
has become a common metaphor for the Canadian constitutional decision-
making model, 16 can be used to describe both global and local relations. Let
me reiterate that I am not focusing on the impact of comparative decision-
making on the development of legal doctrine. My aim is not to detail the
process of "borrowing" foreign law or other ways in which it might be used.
Instead, I will be focusing on how acceptance or rejection of foreign law as
persuasive authority fits with or even affects other aspects of judicial
reasoning. The arguments stem from the recognition that a comparative
perspective in decision-making must have some impact on the decision-
making body itself and the system within which it operates, not simply on the
outcomes it reaches.
This is primarily a discursive article, not positive or prescriptive. It is an
exploration of distinct styles of judicial reasoning and review.1 7 Nonetheless,
the final section goes beyond a mere descriptive intent and suggests that if we
look at the use of comparative reasoning in this broader context, some of the
14. Glenn, Persuasive Authority, supra note 10, at 280-87.
15. Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech in the United States and Canada, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1992, at 5, 6.
16. The most comprehensive discussion of this model of decision-making can be found in
Kent Roach, Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between The Supreme Court and Canadian
Legislatures, 80 CAN. B. REv. 481 (2001). While the term "dialogue" is now commonly used to describe
the Canadian approach it has also come under significant criticism as being inaccurate. See, e.g., F.L.
Morton, Dialogue or Monologue?, POLICY OPTIONS, Apr. 1999, at 23.
17. The notion of culturally distinct forms of judicial review comes from Tom Ginsburg,
Confucian Constitutionalism? The Emergence of Constitutional Review in Korea and Taiwan, 27 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 763 (2002).
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concerns about coherence, legitimacy, and uniformity that drive the rejection
of foreign law by the U.S. Supreme Court begin to diminish.
Section II begins with a discussion of the attitudes of the Supreme
Courts of Canada and the United States with respect to the use of foreign law,
particularly, but not exclusively, in constitutional law. Section III explores
how rejecting or accepting foreign law as persuasive authority fits with other
aspects of judicial reasoning. In this Section, I construct two models of
judicial reasoning-the dialogic and enforcement models-based on the
jurisprudence and attitudes of the Supreme Court of Canada and the U.S.
Supreme Court, respectively, focusing again on constitutional law. Section IV
then turns to concerns about the use of foreign law, in particular to the
concern that it poses a threat to the basic principles underlying and
legitimating decision-making in a common law system.
1I. GLOBAL AND LOCAL JUDICIAL REASONING: A COMPARATIVE CASE
STUDY
A. The Supreme Court of Canada
The Supreme Court of Canada refers to foreign law and foreign cases on
a regular basis. As stated by Justice La Forest, "Canadian courts have never
been averse to the use of foreign materials."' 8 Foreign law is so common in
Canadian Supreme Court decisions that it is difficult to find general
statements regarding the use, relevance or value of such authorities;
comparative judicial reasoning is integral to the Court's methodology. But the
stark contrast between this approach and that followed by the U.S. Supreme
Court has led a few Canadian Supreme Court justices to remark in extra-
judicial contexts on the use of foreign law in decision-making.19
In an article on judicial dialogue, Justice L'Heureux-Dubd bypasses the
question of the relevance of foreign law and focuses on how the use of foreign
law in Canada and elsewhere-with the exception of the United States-has
changed over time. 0 She states:
[T]he process of international influence has changed from reception to dialogue.... As
judgments in different countries increasingly build on each other, mutual respect and
dialogue are fostered among appellate courts. Judges around the world look to each other
for persuasive authority, rather than some judges being "givers" of law while others are
"receivers." 2 1
18. Gdrard V. La Forest, The Use of American Precedents in Canadian Courts, 46 ME. L.
REV. 211, 212 (1994). Justice La Forest retired from the Supreme Court of Canada in 1997.
19. Michel Bastarache, The Challenge of the Law in the New Millenium, 25 MANITOBA L.J.
411 (1998); La Forest, supra note 18; Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, The Importance of Dialogue:
Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15 (1998); Beverley
McLachlin, Criminal Law: Towards an International Legal Order, 29 HONG KONG L.J. 448 (1999).
20. L'Heureux-Dubd, supra note 19. Justice L'Heureux-Dubd retired from the Supreme Court
of Canada in 2002.
21. Id at 17 (emphasis in original). L'Heureux-Dub6 goes on to discuss four reasons for the
increased dialogue and globalization within the legal community: (1) courts seem to be grappling with
similar issues; (2) human rights are by their very nature international; (3) advances in technology have
2003]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Vol. 28: 409
Justice La Forest makes a similar observation, commenting that, while
the short history of the Canadian legal tradition may at one point in time have
made it necessary for Canadian courts to look beyond their borders for law,22
more recent use of foreign law stems from a genuine interest: "Necessity has
been replaced by a sincere outward-looking interest in the views of other
societies, especially those with traditions similar to ours."
23
There are obvious reasons why the Canadian Supreme Court would
frequently cite American cases, not the least of which are shared cultural and
24legal traditions. Like many other nations with newly enacted bills of rights,
Canada naturally turned to its neighbor, the United States, for guidance in
interpreting its 1982 Charter of Rights.25 Many key Canadian constitutional
cases include lengthy discussions of entire areas of American constitutional
26law. Christopher Manfredi, writing critically about this reliance, points out
that while U.S. decisions "constituted only 2.9 per cent" of the total cases
cited in pre-Charter decisions, by 1990 the "proportion of citations to
authority drawn from U.S. sources rose to 8.6 per cent. 27 Furthermore,
Manfredi notes that between 1984 and 1990, the first crucial years of Charter
litigation, 40 percent of all Charter cases cited U.S. decisions with an average
of six U.S. decisions per case. 2
But there are strong indications that the Canadian Court's interest in
foreign law, including American law, is indeed "sincere" and not a passing
fancy that is likely to die out as Canada develops its own rich body of Charter
cases. First, as already made evident in the comments of Justice L'Heureux-
Dubd, the Supreme Court of Canada refers to cases from a wide selection of
29countries, not simply the United States. Justice La Forest comments that,
while "[lr]eference to American authority abounds," so do "references to...
made the dialogue possible; and (4) there is increased personal contact between judges. Id. at 23-26.
22. The strength and necessity of the use of foreign precedents was very much a product of
Canada's deep connection, both formal and informal, with legal traditions in Britain and France. Even
after confederation, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Britain was the final court of appeal
in Canada until 1949. La Forest, supra note 18, at 212.
23. Id.
24. Justice La Forest comments that Canada and the U.S. share a "common law heritage in
private law and in liberal democratic and federal structures of government" as well as commercial forces
"peculiar to the North American legal and societal development." Id. at 212-213.
25. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms)
[hereinafter Charter]. There was a legislative Bill of Rights existing prior to the Charter. Canadian Bill
of Rights, S.C. 1960, c.44. Canada also had a written constitution prior to the passage of the 1982
Constitution Act, but that constitution, still in force, deals primarily with separation of powers. British
North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.)
The influence of the United States Bill of Rights is certainly apparent in the Canadian
Charter, but equally if not more apparent is the influence of international human rights documents. See
L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 19, at 19.
26. See, e.g., R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (detailing the development of the right of
privacy in American constitutional jurisprudence); R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (detailing the
development of the "fighting words" doctrine and its application to hate speech in American
constitutional jurisprudence).
27. Christopher Manfredi, The Judicialization of Politics: Rights and Public Policy in Canada
and the United States, in DEGREES OF FREEDOM: CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES IN A CHANGING
WORLD 310, 321-22 (Keith Banting et al., eds., 1997).
28. Id. at 321-22.
29. L'Heureux-Dubd, supra note 19. See also La Forest, supra note 18, at 216.
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general international covenants., 30 In fact, Justice L'Heureux-Dubd is of the
opinion that if the U.S. Supreme Court continues to see itself as
predominantly a "giver" and refuses to consider the relevance of decisions
from other legal systems, this will eventually lead courts in other legal
systems, including Canada, to view U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence as
irrelevant and isolated. To date, the United States has undoubtedly been the
largest exporter of human rights law to Canada, but as a more global law of
human rights develops through dialogue between courts, those not interested
in engaging in that dialogue, according to Justice L'Hereux-Dubd, will no
doubt see their influence diminish.3'
Second, the use of foreign law in the Canadian Supreme Court extends
back much further than the passage of the Charter. During the period in which
the Court's decisions were subject to review by the Privy Council, the
Supreme Court of Canada cited more British cases than Canadian cases.32 Not
until the 1960s did citations to Canadian cases exceed British citations. But at
the same time, between the 1950s and 1970s, references to foreign law,
generally speaking, nearly tripled in frequency.: Furthermore, while
references to U.S. authority have increased since the passage of the Charter,
they first began to appear with some regularity in the mid-1970s under Chief
Justice Laskin.
34
Finally, the Canadian Supreme Court cites to foreign law in a wide array
of cases, not just Charter cases.35 Justice La Forest makes this point in his
analysis of the use of foreign law, citing examples in labor law, sovereign
immunity, conflict of laws, tort, contract, and fiduciary relationships.
36
Foreign law even appears in statutory interpretation cases. For example,
Thomson v. Canada, referred to a leading Australian case in trying to
30. Gdrard V. La Forest, The Expanding Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in
International Law Issues, 1996 CAN. Y.B. INT'L. L. 89,97.
31. One example of this diminishing support can be found in a decision of the Supreme Court
of South Africa, Witwatersrand Local Division, Ferreira v. Levin NO., 1995 (4) BCLR 437 (W)(SA).
The case concerned freedom from self-incrimination and the court examined and quoted numerous Fifth
Amendment cases. But surprisingly, the U.S. cases, including Miranda, took a back seat to comparable
jurisprudence from Canada, Germany, Britain, and the European Court of Human Rights. For further
discussion of this issue, see L'Heureux-Dubd, supra note 19, at 29-30. Justice Barak of the Supreme
Court of Israel has also suggested that the influence of American law might be declining for a complex
set of reasons, including its failure to engage in comparative reasoning. Aharon Barak, Foreword: A
Judge on Judging. The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARv. L. REv. 16,27, 114 (2002).
32. Peter McCormick, The Supreme Court of Canada and American Citations 1945-1994: A
Statistical Overview, 8 SUP. CT. L. REv. 527, 533 (1997).
33. Glenn, Persuasive Authority, supra note 10, at 296. But see id. at 292 (noting a certain
hostility to foreign law in some of the mid-century cases).
34. McCormick, supra note 32, at 535-38. One of the explanations for this growth in U.S.
citations under Chief Justice Laskin is that he was the first Chief Justice to have received some legal
education in the United States.
35. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Canada is much broader than U.S. Supreme
Court jurisdiction. It is the final court of appeal for any and every legal issue whether provincial or
federal, statutory or common law, public or private law. For a discussion of the differences in the
jurisdiction of the highest courts of Australia, the United States, and Canada, see H. Patrick Glenn,
Divided Justice? Judicial Structures in Federal and Confederal States, 46 S.C. L. REv. 819 (1995);
Glenn, supra note 12, at 272.
36. La Forest, supra note 18, at 216-17.
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determine the definition of "recommendation." 37 In private law cases during a
four-year time period (1989-1993), the Court cited one American case for
every four Canadian cases. This was, in fact, double the ratio of American
cases cited in Charter decisions.
38
The best indication of the level of citation to foreign law in Canadian
Supreme Court decisions can be found in a study that measured such citations
in all cases. In the ten years between 1984 and 1994, approximately twenty-
three percent of all cases cited by the Supreme Court of Canada were foreign
and close to seven percent of all cases cited were from the United States. 39 In
addition to this extensive use of foreign cases, the Supreme Court of Canada is
also comfortable citing foreign academic writings and secondary sources, such
as the writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes. °
It is worth noting that even Canadian provincial courts are comfortable
with the use of foreign law. In a study of the highest court in the province of
Alberta, judges expressed some reluctance about using American law unless
presented with a persuasive reason to do so-for example "if there are no
Canadian or English cases" on the issue.41 But the judges were on the whole
very comfortable citing English cases and admitted to finding New Zealand,
Australian, South African, and European Community law useful on occasion.
With respect to the European Court of Human Rights, one judge stated that it
"had some very interesting cases that are most instructive.' 42 Justice La
Forest, citing the use of Maine law by the Supreme Court of New Brunswick,
has commented that while borrowing and discussing foreign law is not as
common at the regional level as it is at the national, there is nonetheless some
43history of regional dialogue. While these remarks may seem random, a more
methodical look at citation patterns revealed that approximately twenty
percent of provincial court citations in cases published in the Dominion Law
Reports were to foreign law.44
Canadian courts-in particular the Supreme Court of Canada-may
present a particularly striking example of openness, but they are not alone in
their interest in foreign law. Professor McCrudden and others have remarked
that use of foreign law is on the rise even in British courts,45 typically
37. [1992] 1 S.C.R. 385.
38. McCormick, supra note 32, at 539-40.
39. Id at 533.
40. See, e.g., Creighton v. The Queen, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3, 63; Symes v. Canada, [1993] 4
S.C.R. 695, 806-07.
41. PETER MCCORMICK & IAN GREENE, INSIDE THE CANADIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM: JUDGES AND
JUDGING 181 (1990).
42. Id.
43. La Forest, supra note 18, at 211.
44. Glenn, supra note 12, at 286-87.
45. McCrudden, supra note 5, at 504-05, cites the following comment from Lord Steyn: "Law
Lords expect a high standard of research and presentation from barristers .... For example, if the appeal
involves a statutory offence we would expect counsel to be familiar with... comparative material from,
say, Australia and New Zealand." Eric Stein comments that even British lawmaking has opened to
foreign influence in an unprecedented way. Eric Stein, supra note 7 at 210. See also Basil Markesinis,
Foreign Law Inspiring National Law: Lessons from Greatorex v. Greatorex, 61(2) CAMBRIDGE L.J. 386
(2002) (discussing the High Court's reliance on German Law in resolving a specific negligence based
issue); and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, supra note 7, at 1117.
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regarded as being both nationalistic and imperious.
46 And in human rights
cases, courts nearly everywhere seem to be taking an interest in "borrowing
and lending across porous cultural boundaries.
' 'A7
Finally it is worth pointing out how it is that the Supreme Court of
Canada uses foreign law, or, to draw on the title of this Article, engages in
comparative reasoning. Comparative reasoning does not mean that in every
case the foreign law in question is followed or is perceived to be binding; its
relevance is at the level of persuasive authority.48 Foreign cases are taken as
providing statements of principles that the Court can use directly to shape its
own jurisprudence or to distinguish a uniquely Canadian approach and
solution. Foreign reasoning is rarely imported wholesale in Canadian cases as
it once was with respect to cases from the House of Lords and the Privy
Council. Under the current approach, referred to by Professor Sujit Choudhry
as "dialogical interpretation," courts "identify the normative and factual
assumptions underlying their own constitutional jurisprudence by engaging
with comparable jurisprudence of other jurisdictions. 49
There are certainly occasions when the Supreme Court of Canada has
found a foreign case extremely useful and has, in part or whole, adopted the
foreign law in question, but there are comparable numbers of situations where
foreign law is rejected as inapplicable in the context of Canadian law and
society.50 Thus, the problems and pitfalls of foreign jurisprudence are as
important as the useful and persuasive bits.
5'
B. The United States Supreme Court
In light of the recent body of scholarship on comparative constitutional
law, it hardly needs to be stated that the U.S. Supreme Court ranges from
indifferent to hostile in its reaction to foreign law. Several of the Justices
currently sitting on the Court have no interest in foreign law, a position that
was more than adequately conveyed by the denial of certiorari in Knight v.
Florida.52 The petitioners, Moore and Knight, argued that twenty years on
death row was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. In
the opinion denying certiorari, Justice Thomas criticized the petitioners for
their reliance on law from foreign jurisdictions-the Privy Council, India,
Zimbabwe, and the European Court of Human Rights. Implicit in his choice of
words rejecting foreign law is the somewhat remarkable position that reliance
46. In this way Glenn sees the United States and England as very much adopting the same
attitude toward foreign law. In both cases, law is viewed as a "national response." Glenn, Persuasive
Authority, supra note 10, at 283-4.
47. David Nelken, Disclosing/Invoking Legal Culture: An Introduction, 4 SOC. & LEGAL
STUD. 435, 440 (1995).
48. See Glenn, Persuasive Authority, supra note 10.
49. Choudhry, supra note 1, at 825.
50. L'Heureux-Dubd, supra note 19, at 19-20.
51. For a discussion of the relevance of foreign law as a negative influence or "anti-model"
see Sujit Choudhry, The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism, Public Law and Legal
Theory Research Paper no. 02-22, at http://ssm.com/abstractid=363220; Heinz Klug, Model and Anti-
Model: The United States Constitution and the "Rise of World Constitutionalism," 2000 Wis. L. REv.
597.
52. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999).
20031
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Vol. 28: 409
on foreign law is a clear indication of failure or lack of support under U.S.
constitutional law. He stated:
I write only to point out that I am unaware of any support in the American constitutional
tradition or in this Court's precedent for the [defendant's] proposition.... Indeed, were
there any such support in our own jurisprudence, it would be unnecessary for proponents
of the claim to rely on the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court of
Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court of India, or the Privy Council. 
3
In short, foreign law was not only unwelcome and lacking in persuasive value,
its very foreignness undermined the petitioners' case. In a more recent denial
of certiorari, nearly an exact replay of the Knight decision, Justice Thomas
reaffirmed his position on the use of foreign law, referring to the findings of
European and Canadian courts in cases cited by Justice Breyer as "foreign
moods, fads, or fashions. 54
In his dissent in Knight, Justice Breyer argued that foreign law is useful
in interpreting the Eighth Amendment, at least with respect to the death
penalty issue then before the Court. Justice Breyer justified his openness to
foreign law by arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court has a history of looking at
"the way in which foreign courts have applied standards roughly comparable
to our own constitutional standards in roughly comparable circumstances."
55
But Justice Breyer's argument does not find much support. The examples he
gives are few and far between and only three of his cited cases are from the
last twenty years.5 6 Nonetheless, Justice Breyer is not alone in arguing that the
U.S. Supreme Court has a tradition of comparative reasoning, rather than an
"ambivalent resistance ' 57 to foreign law.
In his article on the use of foreign law in human rights cases, Professor
Christopher McCrudden notes that the Court's mid-twentieth century search
for "pre-formed moral judgments" in areas such as due process increased the
potential for use of "opinions of other countries in the Anglo-Saxon tradition
'not less civilized than our own.' 58 And later in the century, "comparative
experience" gained some credibility in capital punishment cases. David
53. Id. at 990.
54. Foster v. Florida, 123 S.Ct. 470, 470 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari).
55. Knight, 528 U.S. at 997. See also Foster, 123 S.Ct. at 472 (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (citing The Federalist No. 63 in support of the idea that "attention to the judgment of
other nations" is useful). Justice Breyer made a similar argument in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997):
Of course, we are interpreting our own Constitution, not those of other nations, and there may be
relevant political and structural differences between their systems and our own. But their
experience may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to
a common legal problem.
Id. at 977.
56. Washington v. Glucksberg 521 U.S. 702, 710 n.8 (1997) (discussing foreign legal
approaches to assisted suicide); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (Stevens, J.)
(considering the practices of other nations regarding the execution of juveniles); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 796-97 n.22 (1982) (noting the elimination or restriction of felony murder in most
commonwealth countries).
57. Jackson, supra note 1, at 589.
58. Sanford Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and
Criteria, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 328.
59. McCrudden, supra note 5, at 509; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830 (noting that the Court
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Fontana also notes the extensive use of comparative reasoning in U.S.
Supreme Court cases. He observes that almost every current Justice has used
comparative reasoning in drafting constitutional opinions at one time or
another and a few have even spoken of the importance of foreign
constitutional law in speeches.60 For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O'Connor, neither one particularly known for the use of foreign law,
have nonetheless each expressed an interest in foreign law in extra-legal
contexts. Fontana remarks that comparative reasoning in constitutional cases
actually "has had a long career in American constitutional law" going all the
way back to the Founders.62 Even Professor Jackson who coined the phrase
"ambivalent resistance" more recently noted that "the Court's manifest
awareness of other constitutional systems is on the rise."63
While references to foreign constitutional law and practices may indeed
be on the rise, they continue to be few and far between. Even those who have
commented on the growing significance of foreign law willingly admit to a
need for more comparative reasoning. For example, the purpose of Fontana's
article is to argue for increased use of foreign law in constitutional cases-
what he terms "refined comparativism."
64
A search of U.S. Supreme Court cases turns up a remarkably low
number of cases in which there is even a passing reference to foreign law or
legal practice. 65 In a simple online search of thepast ten years, I was able to
locate only ten cases referring to Canadian law,6 four referring to Australian
law67 and two referring to New Zealand law.68 A search for cases from the
should look to foreign law to determine what would "offend civilized standards of decency").
60. Fontana, supra note 1, at 545-49.
61. Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts, supra note 3, at 412; Slaughter, Judicial Globalization,
supra note 7, at 1118-19 (citing Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Our Shrinking World: Why Lawyers
Need International Awareness, Keynote Address to the Union International des Advocates (Sept. 3,
1997)); Sandra Day O'Connor, Broadening Our Horizons: Why American Lawyers Must Learn About
Foreign Law, 45 FED. LAW., Sept. 1998, at 20.
62. Fontana, supra note 1, at 591. See also James H. Lengel, The Role of International Law in
the Development of Constitutional Jurisprudence in the Supreme Court: The Marshall Court and
American Indians, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117 (1999) (exploring the constitutional principles developed
to govern the relationship between the new United States and the Indian nations that existed at the time
of the European conquest).
63. Vicki Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional
Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 252 (2001) (citing the use of foreign constitutional law by even its most
vocal opponent-Justice Scalia-in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm n, 514 U.S. 334, 38 1-8 (1995)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
64. Fontana, supra note 1, at 566-74 (Section 111, "The Virtues of Refined Comparativism,"
identifying both the "pragmatic" and "normative" virtues of "refined comparativism.")
65. By reference to foreign law, I mean the law of a foreign nation was considered or at least
mentioned as either supporting an American legal doctrine or providing an alternative approach.
66. Foster v. Florida, 123 S.Ct. 470, 472 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 996, (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari);
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 403 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring); El Al Israel
Airlines v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 176 (1999) (Ginsburg, J.); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 718 n.16 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J.); McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 381; Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines,
516 U.S. 217, 228 (1996) (Scalia, J.); Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 298, 324 n.22
(1994) (Ginsburg, J.); American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 466 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 945 n.1 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
67. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 718 n.16 (Rehnquist, C.J.); McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 381 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 324 n.22 (Ginsburg, J); Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. MIV,
515 U.S. 528, 537 (1995) (Kennedy, J.).
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United Kingdom turns up many more, but this is largely due to historical
references rather than the use of current English law in analyzing American
legal disputes. Counting only once the cases that cited laws of one of more of
these common law jurisdictions during the last ten years, there are a total of
eleven cases. Perhaps of greater significance is the fact that in all of these
cases, the foreign law appeared as nothing more than a polite reference; there
was no extended discussion of the foreign law being cited.
This, of course, does not represent the totality of references to foreign
law in the past ten years of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. But without
doing a search for references to every country, it is reasonable to speculate
that references to other non-common law jurisdictions are not likely to be any
more prevalent than references to the common law jurisdictions mentioned
above, perhaps with the exception of Germany 69 and more generally the
European Community.7 ° In short, the U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. courts in
general seldom cite foreign law and, until the recent surge in comparative
constitutional experience, there has been "scant legal literature on the use of
foreign and comparative law in U.S. courts because courts rarely cite foreign
law."
With this background in mind, perhaps the view of the current Court,
generally speaking, is not represented by Justice Breyer's statement that "this
Court has long considered as relevant" opinions of foreign courts, particularly
those of "former Commonwealth nations."72 Instead, Justice Scalia's comment
in his opinion for the court in Stanford v. Kentucky seems more accurate: "it is
American standards of decency that are dispositive, rejecting the contentions
of the petitioners ...that the sentencing practices of other countries are
relevant., 73 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, quite recently
referred to the opinion of the "world community" in support of what he called
a "national consensus" against the execution of the mentally retarded.74 But
the reference was limited to a single footnote and was roundly criticized in
dissents by both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia
stated, "the Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate 'national
consensus' must go to its appeal ... to the views of assorted professional and
68. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 718 n.16 ; ElAllsraelAirlines, 525 U.S. at 176 n.16.
69. The law of Germany is more frequently cited than other civil law jurisdictions because its
constitution, both in design and function, shares more in common with the U.S. Constitution. See Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976 (1997) (Breyer J., dissenting) (citing principles of federalism in
Germany and the European Union); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 945 n.1 (1992)
(Rehnquist C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828 (1997) (referring to the procedures of "some
European constitutional courts").
71. David S. Clark, The Use of Comparative Law by American Courts, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 23
(1994). See also Glenn, supra note 12, at 288 n.106 (noting a study on citation practices from the
California Supreme Court in which "citations to English authorities represent less than one-half of one
per cent of citations; the rest of the world is absent").
72. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999).
73. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n. I (1989). Scalia has made similar arguments in
other cases. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 921 n. I1 (arguing that "comparative analysis is inappropriate to
the task of interpreting a constitution"); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-69 n.4 (1988). For
his comments in academic contexts, see Antonin Scalia, Conference of Supreme Courts of the Americas:
Commentary, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1119, 1119 (1996) (focusing more on international law and norms
rather than the domestic law of foreign nations).
74. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
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religious organizations, members of the so-called 'world community,' and
respondents to opinion polls.
75
In short, the U.S. Supreme Court rarely treats foreign constitutional or
other legal experience as relevant. But this approach is not limited to the
Court. American constitutional theory also evidences a clear isolationism.
Professor Marian McKenna has remarked that constitutional research in the
United States has tended to cluster around questions of constitutional origins,
the intent of the framers, and the uniqueness of American constitutional
experience. 76 While there are many competing schools of constitutional theory
and thought, a "heroic" vision of the Constitution, stressing connections
between the text and another time in American history when "someone got it
right"77 is a particularly conspicuous feature of American constitutional
theory. Beyond constitutional theory, Professor Patrick Glenn has argued that
the American obsession with creating a self-contained and binding national
legal system, combined with the vast build-up and publication of national law,
naturally led to the development of a sort of "national implosion' 78 in which
"legal writers .. .have .. .become largely preoccupied with giving 'an
account of what is happening amongst themselves.'
79
Even popular opinion about the Constitution reflects a certain
parochialism. Professor McKenna observes that Americans tend to think of
questions of basic human rights and public policy almost exclusively in terms
of their Constitution, as if it were the center and source of all such policies
domestically and internationally. 8 Indeed, even American insistence on the
use of the terms "civil" and "constitutional" rights, rather than "human" rights
as used in other places, is evidence that a sense of shared common experience
with other jurisdictions regarding such rights is missing.81 In keeping with this
reflection, Professor Paul Stephan has recently criticized the tendency of U.S.
courts, particularly the Second Circuit, to widen their spheres of influence
over foreign matters. The aim of this extension of power, according to
Stephan, reflects an unbecoming "ambitious use of U.S. civil justice for
righting international wrongs. 82 He begins his comments by stating, "our
courts might surrender some of their pride in favor of a more becoming
modesty." 83
If we turn our focus back to the Court and its failure to use foreign law, a
possible counterargument might be found in the diversity existing within the
75. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. Marian McKenna, Introduction: A Legacy of Questions, in THE CANADIAN AND
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ix, xi (Marian C. McKenna ed., 1993).
77. David Strauss, The New Textualism in Constitutional Law, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153,
1154 (1998) (raising concerns about textualism and commenting that it "takes an essentially heroic view
of the Constitution").
78. Glenn, Persuasive Authority, supra note 10, at 287.
79. Id. (quoting Christopher D. Stone, From a Language Perspective, 90 YALE L.J. 1149,
1151 n.7 (1981)).
80. McKenna, supra note 76, at xiii.
81. McCrudden, supra note 5, at 529-30.
82. Paul B. Stephan, A Becoming Modesty-U.S. Litigation in the Mirror of International
Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 627,629-30 (2002).
83. Id. at 628.
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United States legal system. Each of the fifty states, with their own separate
jurisdiction and body of constitutional, statutory and common law, provides a
wealth of "foreign" jurisdictions to draw from, and the Court indeed does
draw case law and opinions from these jurisdictions. 84 As Justice Aharon
Barak of the Supreme Court of Israel notes in a discussion of comparative
reasoning, "American law is comprised of not one but fifty-one legal
systems."85 With so many separate jurisdictions, there is already a great deal
of diversity in U.S. law, and so perhaps it is not necessary for the U.S.
Supreme Court to resort to law from outside the United States.
A number of responses to this argument spring to mind. First, this hardly
explains the disparity in the use of foreign law between the U.S. Supreme
Court and the Supreme Court of Canada. While fifty different state
jurisdictions can no doubt provide more diversity and legal options than
Canada's ten provinces, the added advantage of additional jurisdictions cannot
account for the stark differences in approach. As a consequence of their
federal structures, both countries have rich and diverse bodies of state or
provincial law. While the difference in numbers of legal jurisdictions might
produce slightly different rates of foreign law citation, it is not on its own a
convincing explanation for the vastly different attitudes toward foreign law.
Second, and related to the first point, the law of the fifty different U.S.
states is not likely to be as diverse as the numbers suggest, particularly in the
area of constitutional law, which is the primary focus of this Article. While
there have been calls for state courts to be more independent in interpreting
state constitutional provisions that mirror or are largely similar to federal
constitutional provisions, in reality many states adhere to a "lockstep
approach." In this way, "congruence with federal decisional law is assumed to
be the norm, and deviation is for all intents and purposes impossible."
86
Uniformity is the primary justification offered in support of this approach.
Third, the most vocal isolationists on the Court, particularly Justice
Scalia, do not point to the diversity of domestic law as a reason for refusing to
use foreign law. Justice Scalia's rejection of foreign law is based on a
principled distinction between American and foreign sources of law, not the
amount of existing diversity within American law. Furthermore, when U.S.
Supreme Court Justices have called for more consideration of foreign law, it
has not been because of a lack of diverse legal positions within the American
legal system, but, from all appearances, out of a sincere interest in examining
the approaches of entirely different systems.
Two additional comments are worth making before moving on. First, the
U.S. Supreme Court has historically been a "rights expander," and this
expansion has occurred in relative isolation. Until quite recently only the
European Court of Human Rights could claim to be as rights-focused as the
84. For an interesting discussion of the potential for "dialogue" between state courts and the
U.S. Supreme Court with respect to shared state and federal constitutional provisions, see Lawrence
Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 93 (2000).
85. Barak, supra note 31, at 114.
86. See Friedman, supra note 84, at 102-03.
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U.S. Supreme Court, or more specifically, the Warren Court, and so by
necessity it pursued its rights expansion without reference to foreign 
law.87
Given this history, it is not surprising that the U.S. Supreme Court would look
upon foreign precedents with some skepticism. This, however, is little more
than an explanation for its current position, not a serious justification when
other nations have embraced rights discourse within their constitutional
frameworks.
Second, the U.S. Supreme Court is not alone in its skepticism. Professor
Christopher McCrudden remarks that, with respect to human rights decisions,
there has been a "persistent undercurrent of scepticism" about the use of
foreign law in a number of countries. The concern is that the randomness of
choice of jurisdiction reflects a "cherry picking" approach and raises questions
of relevance.8 8 These are legitimate substantive concerns that have been
addressed by others who have tried to determine the right context for the use
of foreign law, as well as appropriate sources. 89 But as a justification for the
Court's isolationism, this is seriously lacking. To argue in one breath that a
foreign perspective is inapposite and in the next that foreign courts share this
view would be contradictory. In short, while the views of foreign courts about
the use of foreign law might on their own account be interesting, they cannot
support the U.S. Supreme Court's rejection of foreign law.
Although this brief discussion of the use of foreign law in the Supreme
Courts of Canada and the United States is in no way exhaustive, it strongly
suggests two very different approaches to judicial reasoning. Despite the fact
that a few U.S. Supreme Court Justices have expressed interest in comparative
judicial reasoning, the Court as a whole has so far hesitated to move in that
direction. The Supreme Court of Canada, on the other hand, has fully
embraced a comparative approach to decision-making. Its use of foreign law
is extensive both in the variety of legal systems to which it refers and in the
substantive range of cases it cites. In short, the Supreme Court of Canada has
developed a form of judicial review that is global and dialogic while the U.S.
Supreme Court remains focused on local, binding authority.
III. FORMS OF DIALOGUE AND MODELS OF JUDICIAL REASONING
The first section of this paper briefly sketched out the differences
between the Supreme Court of Canada and the U.S. Supreme Court with
respect to the use of foreign law. This section explores more deeply the
different attitudes of these two courts toward foreign law and connects such
attitudes with other elements of their respective approaches to judicial review.
In particular, this section will explore the potential impact of a comparative
approach on a court's perception of its role in the larger legal community. To
87. McCrudden, supra note 5, at 527 ("The high point of [a rights-expanding] agenda in the
U.S.A. was surely to be found during the Warren Court era when the Court seldom used foreign judicial
precedents.").
88. Id. at 507.
89. See Fontana, supra note 1; Tushnet, supra note 1.
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frame this as a question, if the Supreme Court of Canada routinely refers to
foreign law, does this tell us something about how the Court perceives its
place in the Canadian legal landscape? And if the U.S. Supreme Court makes
a point of rejecting foreign influence, does this have larger implications for its
role in the American legal landscape? In other words, what happens when one
institution focuses on horizontal connections, while another institution prefers
to view its place in vertical and hierarchical terms? 90
The following Section will define two models based on the
jurisprudence and attitudes of the two courts discussed above. The dialogic
model is centered on horizontal, transnational, and interdependent decision-
making. Courts that fall under this model are open to foreign law and
international judicial dialogue, as well as dialogue with domestic legal
institutions- legislatures and other courts. In short, the dialogic model
introduces the possibility of a wider range of influences and shifting-or at
least less defined-lines of authority. All of this leads to a greater level of, and
indeed tolerance for, ambiguity in the authority of the court and its decision-
making. The enforcement model, based on the approach of the U.S. Supreme
Court, is centered on local, independent, and final decision-making. It
privileges finality and certainty over dialogue. Like the dialogic model, this
approach extends beyond the court's attitude to foreign law. Courts adhering
to the enforcement model view themselves not as mediators or partners in an
active dialogue, but rather as local law enforcers whose position with respect
to legislatures and other courts is clearly defined. Through the assertion of
strong authoritative and definitive decisions, the court establishes itself as an
ultimate authority in its own self-defined realm.
The following section will elaborate on each of these models as they
emerge from the jurisprudence and attitudes of the Supreme Court of Canada
and the U.S. Supreme Court.
A. Dialogic Model
1. Foreign Law and Transnational Dialogue
The nature and usefulness of cross-border judicial dialogue has been
explored in a variety of articles. For example, Professor Choudhry has written
about "dialogical interpretation" in constitutional law,91 Professor McCrudden
has exlored "transnational judicial conversations" in the area of human
rights,9 and Professor Slaughter has more generally focused on "transjudicial
dialogue. 93 These and other individuals who have touched on the subject
consistently recognize that cross-border judicial dialogue or conversation is
something different from the more limited notion of borrowing legal
90. See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, THE HORIZONTAL SOCIETY 5-15 (1999) (discussing the
distinction between legal identities based on vertical relationships and identities based on horizontal
relationships).
91. Choudhry, supra note 1.
92. MeCrudden, supra note 5.
93. Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, supra note 7.
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precedents. Borrowing entails the direct application of foreign law,94 whereas
judicial dialogue involves many more forms of interaction and interpretation.
The notion of "comparative reasoning" is being used here to describe a
general willingness on the part of judges to discuss, analyze, and distinguish,
as well as to borrow foreign precedents.
A good example of this approach to foreign law can be found in the
Canadian case The Queen v. Keegstra,95 upholding hate speech legislation.
Much has been written about the differences and similarities between this case
and R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul,96 which was decided just a few years later by
the U.S. Supreme Court, and which found comparable hate speech legislation
to be unconstitutional. 97 But what makes Keegstra interesting for our present
purposes is Chief Justice Dickson's discussion of American First Amendment
jurisprudence. Dickson spends much time and energy detailing the evolution
of the "fighting words" doctrine and the current position of the U.S. Supreme
Court regarding the regulation of hate speech. At the conclusion of this
discussion, Dickson argues that the rejection of hate speech legislation as
impermissible content and viewpoint-based regulation under the First
Amendment is consistent neither with Canadian free speech principles nor
American First Amendment jurisprudence.
Chief Justice Dickson's use of foreign law is thus quite remarkable. He
does not explore American jurisprudence as a viable alternative but rather
raises it as a way to elaborate on a position that he is not willing to follow.
American First Amendment doctrine becomes "the other"98 legal position
against which Chief Justice Dickson is able to discern and then define a
unique Canadian approach. He states:
Though I have found the American experience tremendously helpful in coming to my
own conclusions regarding this appeal, and by no means reject the whole of the First
Amendment doctrine, in a number of respects I am thus dubious as to the applicability of
this doctrine in the context of a challenge to hate propaganda legislation. . . . [T]he
special role given equality and multiculturalism in the Canadian Constitution necessitates
a departure from the view, reasonably prevalent in America at present, that the
suppression of hate propaganda is incompatible with guarantee of free expression. 9
While Chief Justice Dickson makes it clear that his concerns surround
the application of First Amendment doctrine in a Canadian context, his
arguments suggest that he is not convinced of the validity of the current
American approach, even in an American legal context. He states, relying on
the work of American legal scholars, that "hate propaganda can undermine the
very values which free speech is said to protect ... [and] First Amendment
94. For recent discussion of some of the difficulties of directly borrowing foreign law in the
American context, see Oscar Chase, American Exceptionalism and Comparative Procedure, 50 AM. J.
COMP. L. 277 (2002).
95. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
96. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
97. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 1; Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into
the Foundations and Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REv. 1275 (1998).
98. McCrudden uses this same phrase to describe the Irish Supreme Court's discussion and
rejection of Roe v. Wade. McCrudden, supra note 5, at 518.
99. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 743.
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doctrine might be able to accommodate statutes prohibiting hate
propaganda."IU0
Chief Justice Dickson's attempt to distinguish First Amendment doctrine
regarding hate speech is an excellent example of a dialogic approach to the
use of foreign law. Needless to say, the conversation was one-sided-the U.S.
Supreme Court did not discuss Keegstra when it decided R.A. V. just two years
later. But the way he incorporates, critiques, and suggests alternative
interpretations of American law is a robust example of the eagerness of the
Supreme Court of Canada to engage in a cross-border judicial dialogue while
still paying close attention to local circumstances.
In a more recent Canadian case, United States v. Burns,'0 ' authored by
the Court as a whole, the laws of a number of foreign nations, as well as
international agreements, were reviewed to determine whether extradition of
an accused suspect without assurances that the death penalty would not be
imposed violated Charter requirements of fundamental justice.,0 2 In finding
that extradition without assurances would be a violation of Charter rights, a
departure from the Court's previous opinion on this question, the Court relied
on international initiatives to abolish the death penalty, 0 3 "accelerating
concern about the potential wrongful convictions" in the United States, 0 4 and
the "death row phenomenon" in the United States. 05 Thus the Court's
decision was based on a close critique of a host of legal and social factors
from Canada, the United States, and the rest of the world community.'
0 6
Keegstra is a well-known case involving an area of law that is closely
identified with American constitutionalism. Burns, as an extradition case
concerning the death penalty, is a logical place to find a discussion of foreign
law. But there are plenty of examples from more obscure, less sensational
cases. In Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada,10 7 Justice Cory, writing
for the Court, launched into an analysis of United Kingdom, Australian, and
United States law on the question of public interest standing. Each of these
jurisdictions, he decided, took a more restrictive approach than is warranted in
the Canadian constitutional context.
More generally, Justice La Forest advocates an analysis of international
law similar to the approach to foreign law followed in Keegstra. He states:
[W]e do not confine ourselves to polite references to the international agreements
themselves, but examine with care the interpretations given to them by international
institutions and domestic courts of many countries, as well as in the writings of learned
authors .... What is happening, then, is that we are absorbing international legal norms
affecting the individual through our constitutional pores .... Although in some eases...
100. Id. at 741.
101. [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283.
102. Charter, supra note 25, § 7. The death penalty does not exist in Canada.
103. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. at 331-35.
104. Id. at 342-50.
105. Id. at 350-53.
106. Recently, Justice Breyer cited Burns in support of his position that prolonged periods of
"incarceration before execution" are worthy of the Court's consideration under the Eighth Amendment.
Foster v. Florida, 123 S.Ct. 470, 472 (2002).
107. Canadian Council of Churches, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236.
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our Court has departed from international norms.
10 8
This is a classic example of Professor Choudhry's "dialogical
interpretation." Foreign law, in this instance, is not presented as a choice but
rather as an interpretive tool.109 According to Professor Choudhry, what
distinguishes "dialogical interpretation" from other approaches to the use of
foreign law in constitutional decision-making is that it does not necessarily
rely on drawing essential connections, either through historical lineage or
through an appeal to universal principles. In place of looking for connections,
"dialogical interpretation" is used to identify and enhance the court's
awareness of itself. This method is a process of identifying and justifying the
normative and factual assumptions underlying one's own constitutional
jurisprudence by engaging with comparable jurisprudence of other
jurisdictions.'1° The point therefore is not to search for solutions in foreign
jurisprudence, thereby eradicating constitutional differences, but rather "to
learn from foreign experience without assimilating constitutional
jurisprudence into a larger transnational conversation about rights and
democracy."' It is fundamentally a process of distinction rather than
assimilation. 112
Professor Choudhry's concept of dialogical interpretation is a key
component of what I have termed the dialogic model of judicial reasoning, but
only a component. What is of particular interest to me is the extent to which
the dialogue that takes place with foreign or external legal institutions mirrors
a dialogue at the local level. In short, just as the Supreme Court of Canada is
willing to engage in a dialogue with foreign courts, so it has adopted what
might be described as a dialogic relationship with legislatures and lower
courts in the Canadian legal system.
2. Lower Courts, Legislatures, and Local Dialogue
There are two prominent features of the Supreme Court of Canada and
its particular brand of judicial review that could be viewed as supporting a
dialogic model with respect to domestic legal institutions. The first is the
Supreme Court of Canada's tendency to rely on general standards and
balancing approaches, or put another way, its willingness to engage in more
openly normative analyses, rather than a rigid rule-based approach. How this
relates to a dialogic approach will become clear later on. The second is the
fluid and flexible, maybe even ambiguous relationship that the Court appears
to have with the legislative branches of government. These two aspects of the
108. La Forest, supra note 30, at 98.
109. Choudhry, supra note 1, at 836-37.
110. Id. at 855-58.
111. Id. at 890.
112. Christopher McCrudden makes a similar observation in discussing the uses of foreign law:
"Even where the result of the foreign judicial approach has not been adopted, it has often been
influential in sharpening the understanding of the court's view of domestic law." McCrudden, supra
note 5, at 512. McCrudden takes his discussion one step further and remarks on the non-explicit use of
foreign human rights law in Japan. There, U.S. law is studied and consulted on a regular basis but is
rarely cited. Id. at 511.
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Supreme Court of Canada's jurisprudence, along with its use of foreign law,
support the idea that the Supreme Court of Canada has developed its own
dialogic form of judicial review.
a. Standards, Balancing, and Normative Reasoning
Professor Kathleen Sullivan's classic discussion of rules and standards is
a useful place to begin a discussion of the Supreme Court of Canada's
approach to judicial reasoning.1 3 According to Professor Sullivan, a "legal
directive is 'rule' like when it binds a decision-maker to respond in a
determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts. Rules aim to
confine the decision-maker to facts."' 14 A "legal directive is 'standard' like
when it tends to collapse decision-making back into the direct application of
the background principle or policy to a fact situation.""H5 Standards give "the
decision-maker more discretion than do rules."
' 16
This distinction is supported in the broader jurisprudential literature on
rules and principles. While there is not complete agreement on how best to
understand and describe the differences between these concepts, the notion
that "[r]ules prescribe relatively specific acts; principles prescribe highly
unspecific actions,"''1 7 is a commonly shared proposition.'' 8 Like principles,
"standard-like" legal decisions thus provide more possibilities for future
decision-making whereas rules are more focused and constraining."
9
As Professor Sullivan notes, while rules are sometimes associated with
the right of the political spectrum and standards with the left, there is in fact
very little correlation between political ideologies and the use of rules or
standards. Rather, standards are more closely associated with moderation, and
rules with more extreme, ideological positions, whether on the right or left.
Professor Sullivan states: "The choice of standards over rules thus dampens
ideological swings as compared with a shift from one polar rule to another."',
20
Another distinction relevant to the present analysis is that standards, unlike
inflexible rules, tend to be the agents of change. They "better accommodate a
world in which . . . formerly clear boundaries . . . have been relativized or
dissolved."'
12 1
113. Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22 (1992).
114. Id. at 58.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 59,
117. Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823,838 (1972).
118. See also Frederick Schauer, Prescriptions in Three Dimensions, 82 IOWA L. REv. 911,914
(1997).
119. While the commonalities in "standards" and "principles" are clear, these concepts do not
completely overlap. Through the stipulation of a list of important, albeit non-determinative factors,
standards do aim to constrain both reasoning and outcomes, arguably more so than principles. It may
also be the case that these concepts differ in their function, with standards serving to "measure" the
legality of behavior whereas principles serve to provide "mutual orientation." PETER DRAHOS & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 19 (2000). However, for my present purposes it is
enough to note that by nature standards are closer to principles than rules in their directive capacity.
120. Sullivan, supra note 113, at 99.
121. Id. at 107.
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If we stopped here in our description of the distinction between rules and
standards, the argument for associating standards with a more dialogic
approach to decision-making should be clear. 122 Standards imply an ongoing
openness to interpretation and change. In formulating a standard or a
balancing type of test, a judge is implicitly accepting a wider set of possible
interpretations by both lower courts and future judges. In this way, standards
foster a dialogue focused on change and varying circumstances rather than
fixing-or attempting to fix-a solution for other decision-makers whether
present or future. Dialogue between judges and courts occurs in the implicit
interpretive space provided by balancing tests and standards. While rules may
in fact provide as much interpretive space, such a consequence is indeed
contrary to their intended constraining effect.
Professor Sullivan, however, goes on to make an additional point that
further evinces the connection between standard-like decision-making and a
dialogic approach. She argues that judges who feel it is important to craft rules
that they suppose to be value-free also view their judicial role as being a
mouthpiece for the unambiguous text of the law, including the Constitution. 23
Judges who are comfortable with standards are more concerned with
"continuity" and they view the Constitution as a "coherent succession. ' ' 24
They see social practices and shared understandings, not a discontinuous set
of authorities and texts, as providing the foundation for line drawing. They are
more inclined to see legal precedents as an ambiguous, multidirectional and
yet continuous series of ideas and decisions.125 In short, standards indicate a
more dialogic approach in that they are, by their very nature, more explicit
about the presence of ongoing interpretation, and judges who choose
standards seem to have a more partnership-like understanding of their judicial
role.
While a standard-based approach to decision-making implies a certain
level of comfort with ambiguity and discretion, the same amount of discretion
and ambiguity could be found in the task of choosing a rule or in recognizing
an exception. In other words, judicial discretion is implicit in both rule and
standard-based approaches, and the primary difference rests in how explicit a
court is in its toleration of judicial discretion. In this way, it could be argued
that the difference between rule-like and standard-like decisions is primarily
stylistic rather than substantive.
But the argument here is that style is important, not only in the message
conveyed to lower courts, but also in what it says about the attitudes of those
judges who are choosing between different styles of decision-making. A
standard-based approach to judicial reasoning tells us, among other things,
that the court is comfortable with-in fact may even prefer-dialogue and
122. For a civic republican defense of the "communicative" nature of standards or balancing
tests, see Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government,
100 HARV. L. REv. 4, 34-35 (1986).
123. Sullivan, supra note 113, at 114-15.
124. Id. at 116 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992) (opinion of
O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy, JJ.))
125. Sullivan, supra note 113, at 115-21.
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shared responsibility for the creation of legal norms rather than a more top-
down and constrained development of legal doctrine.
A number of scholars writing in the area of comparative constitutional
law have remarked that the Supreme Court of Canada relies on standard and
balancing approaches in decision-making more so than the U.S. Supreme
Court. Professor Kent Greenawalt notes in an article on free speech law in
Canada that the Canadian Supreme Court has very much embraced a
balancing approach, "openly weigh[ing] crucial factors," whereas the U.S.
Supreme Court employs a "conceptual approach" utilizing "categorical
analysis.', 126 So whereas the U.S. Supreme Court has a well-crafted body of
rules dealing with the constitutional protection of speech, Canada has yet to
create a comparable body of rules and "the contextualized standard ... will
probably limit such doctrinal proliferation by making much of it
unnecessary."'
127
He goes on to mention that what has determined the choice between
these two approaches is largely "constitutional language and broader
traditions concerning review of legislative and executive action."
128
Specifically, Professor Greenawalt discusses Section 1 of the Charter which is
an explicit balancing provision, requiring a court to determine whether the
violation of a substantive Charter right is nonetheless a reasonable limit
"prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society."' 129 While the mere presence of this provision ensures a certain
amount of balancing in many Charter decisions, the Court's comfort with
balancing and a more contextual standard-like approach is evident in the
elaborate balancing procedure established under Section 1. In The Queen v.
Oakes, the Court held that an otherwise unconstitutional law will be upheld if
it pursues an objective of "sufficient importance," is "rationally connected to
the objective," impairs Charter rights "as little as possible," and is not
disproportionately severe in its application when measured against the
objective. 13 This proportionality test, in particular the least restrictive means
requirement, has done much of the heavy lifting in Charter cases.
131
Professor Vicki Jackson also comments on the use of proportionality
tests in Canadian Charter decisions and draws a comparison to the relatively
cautious attitude the U.S. Supreme Court evinces to proportionality tests in
comparable fundamental rights decisions. The differences between these two
courts are evident in the two hate speech cases already mentioned. In R.A. V v.
City of St. Paul,132 the court struck down an ordinance prohibiting "fighting
words" based on race, color, creed, religion, or gender as being an
126. Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 6-7
127. Id. at 10.
128. Id. at 7.
129. Section 1 states in full: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." Charter, supra note 25, § 1.
130. The Queen v. Oakes, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 103, 138-39.
131. Peter Hogg & Alison Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures, 35
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75, 85 (1997).
132. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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impermissible content and viewpoint-based regulation. A comparable
provision under the Canadian Criminal Code was upheld in The Queen v.
Keegstra.133 Although the Court in Keegstra recognized that the provision
clearly infringed the guarantee of free expression found in section 2(b) of the
Charter, it went on to uphold the provision as protecting a legitimate and
important interest-the prevention of hate speech. Jackson notes the "degree
to which the justices explicitly identify competing constitutional values and
make comparative normative assessments about those values, and in doing so
consider the relevance of comparative materials" in Keegstra and other
Canadian cases.' 34 In short, the proportionality analysis in Canadian
constitutional cases has led to a more comparative, frank, open, and contextual
discussion of constitutional norms and conflicts.1
3 5
Another example of this distinction can be found in the exclusionary rule
in criminal law.' 36 Professor James Stribopolous observes that contrary to the
categorical approach of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence, the Supreme Court of Canada has treated the
matter from the start as discretionary and has encouraged judges to exercise
that discretion on a case-by-case basis to determine whether there has been a
violation of a constitutional right.' 37 Not unlike Professor Jackson, Professor
Stribopolous goes on to argue that one of the benefits of a discretionary or
balancing approach is that it leads to a more expansive and honest definition
of constitutional rights because "[c]ourts are not continually preoccupied with
the consequences that flow from their interpretation of constitutional
guarantees."' 38
The terms used in this discussion have been loose and varied. I began
with Professor Sullivan's term "standard" and have since used principles,
balancing, and proportionality almost interchangeably. These ideas are distinct
and perhaps should not be substituted so easily. But in a broad comparative
context it does not seem inappropriate to group them together as generally
indicating a more contextual, open-ended approach to judicial reasoning.
Professor Wayne MacKay has recently noted, speaking of the Canadian Court,
that "contextualizing judicial decisions has become the hallmark of the
modem judiciary and an important principle to be followed in all areas, not
just constitutional law." A few paragraphs later, MacKay, citing interviews
with Canadian Supreme Court justices, notes that while the justices are aware
133. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 697.
134. Jackson, supra note 1, at 612.
135. Id. at 612-13.
136. James Stribopoulos, Lessons from a Pupil: A Canadian Solution to the American
Exclusionary Rule Debate, 22 B.C. INT'L. & COMp. L. REv. 77 (1999).
137. The Supreme Court of Canada in Collins v. R., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, set forth guidelines
for interpreting Section 24(2) of the Charter, which concerns the exclusion of evidence. The Court
organized its considerations into three categories: (1) trial fairness; (2) seriousness of the Charter
violation; and (3) effect of excluding the evidence. Stribopoulos also mentions that a comparable,
discretionary approach has been adopted in search and seizure and privacy concerns under the Canadian
Charter. Stribopoulos, supra note 136, at 134-35.
138. Stribopoulos, supra note 136, at 84.
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that lower courts desire "'one right answer'. . . the majority thought that it
would be intellectually dishonest to move in that direction.
' '139
This tendency toward greater contextualization is perhaps most apparent
in the Court's equality jurisprudence under Section 15 of the Charter. Justice
Iacobucci, writing for the Court in an age discrimination case, states:
It is inappropriate to attempt to confine analysis under s. 15(l) of the Charter to a fixed
and limited formula. A purposive and contextual approach to discrimination analysis is to
be preferred, in order to permit the realization of the strong remedial purpose of the
equality guarantee, and to avoid the pitfalls of a formalistic or mechanical approach.
140
In a recent article on the equality jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of
Canada, Justice L'Heureux-Dubd suggests that this purposive and contextual
approach-as compared to the "rigidity of United States equal protection
doctrine"' 41-has contributed to the significant divergence in the equality
jurisprudence of these two countries. 
142
The picture of the Supreme Court of Canada that emerges from this
discussion is of an openly normative institution, comfortable with contextual
analysis and more willing to live with some ambiguity in its decisions.
4 3
Supreme Court of Canada decisions tend to invite discussion rather than
impose a rule. While much of this can be traced to the text of the Charter, the
Court has clearly embraced this as a defining feature of its jurisprudence.
b. The Supreme Court and Democratic Deliberation
For most of its history, the Supreme Court of Canada adhered to the
British constitutional tradition of parliamentary sovereignty and thus deferred
to the federal and provincial legislatures. Prior to 1982, the Supreme Court of
Canada had the power to interpret the constitution and to declare legislation
unconstitutional, but only on the narrow grounds found in the British North
America Act (BNA),144 a document focusing primarily on the distribution of
legislative powers. In essence, the powers of the federal and provincial
governments were limited only by the federalism scheme found in the BNA-
139. A. Wayne MacKay, The Legislature, The Executive and the Courts: The Delicate Balance
of Power or Who is Running this Country Anyway? 24 DALHOUSIE L.J. 37, 66 (2001) (citing I. GREENE
ET AL., FINAL APPEAL: DECISION-MAKING IN CANADIAN COURTS OF APPEAL 16 (1990).
140. Lawv. Canada, [1999] 170 D.L.R.(4th) 1, para. 88.
141. Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, Realizing Equality in the Twentieth Century: The Role of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Comparative Perspective, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 35, 52 (2003), at
http://www3.oup.co.uk/ijclaw/hdb/Volume_01/Issue_01/pdf/010035.pdf.
142. Id. at 52-53.
143. Jeff Rosen has commented that Justice Breyer of the U.S. Supreme Court is also more
openly normative. He states:
But even when you disagree with Breyer in a particular case, it's hard not to be impressed
with his transparency: More than any other justice, he takes us behind the curtain of his
constitutional reasoning-explicitly identifying the competing interests that he has
weighed in his decision, and showing us how he has weighed them ....
Jeffrey Rosen, Modest Proposal: Stephen Breyer Restrains Himself, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 14, 2002, at
25. Interestingly, Breyer is also interested in consulting and discussing foreign law. See Knight v.
Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 996-98 (1999).
144. Originally cited as the British North America Act, 1867, the Act is now referred to as the
Constitution Act, 1867.
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their powers were as "'plenary and ample' as those of the United Kingdom
Parliament."'
' 45
The Constitution Act of 1982 both entrenched and broadened the scope
of judicial review. Section 52(1) explicitly states that the Constitution is "the
supreme law of Canada" and provides that any law inconsistent with the
Constitution is "to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect."'
46
This section along with the enforcement and remedies section 47 has become
the source and foundation of judicial review in Canada. 48 The Charter,
included in the Constitution Act, 1982, also broadened the Court's power of
judicial review, creating new limits on provincial and federal legislatures.
Like the Bill of Rights found in the American Constitution, the Charter
entrenches a set of human rights thus limiting the power of the legislative
branches to interfere with such rights. 1
49
Since 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada has been more than willing-
some have argued too willing-to use its explicit and extended powers of
judicial review, creating a more politicized judiciary. 50 But others have
argued that the Court is distinctly aware of its delicate position with respect to
democratically elected legislatures.'15 This can be at least partly attributed to
the language of the Charter itself. Section 1, as already discussed, requires the
Court to take a serious look at legislative objectives before it finds legislation
to be unconstitutional. While the same delicate balancing may take place in
constitutional analysis in the United States, the explicit balancing
requirements found in Section 1 seem to add greater weight and significance
to the legislative voice. As Professors Hogg and Bushell note in their study of
"Charter Dialogue," the proportionality analysis in Section 1 provides the
most important forum for dialogue between courts and legislatures. 1
52
The most interesting provision concerning the relationship between
courts and legislatures in Canada is Section 33, the "notwithstanding
clause." 153 Section 33 was adopted in the final stages of Charter negotiations
and was clearly a compromise between the model of parliamentary
sovereignty that Canada had inherited from Britain and the American model
145. PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 272 (1997) (citing Hodge v. The Queen
[1883] 9 App. Cas. 117, 132).
146. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) § 52(1).
147. Id. at § 24(l).
148. Prior to 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada's limited powers of judicial review were
located in the notion that an imperial statute (the BNA) could override colonial legislation. The ultimate
power to review legislation for its constitutionality originally rested with the Privy Council, the then
final court of appeal for Canada. See HOGG, supra note 145, at 5.5(a), 122-25.
149. It is worth noting here that while the American Bill of Rights greatly influenced the
drafting of the Charter, it is commonly accepted that the European Convention on Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Liberties were equally if not more influential.
150. See generally F.L. MORTON & R. KNOPFF, THE CHARTER REVOLUTION AND THE COURT
PARTY (2000).
151. See infra text accompanying notes 161-71.
152. Hogg & Bushell, supra note 131, at 85.
153. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) § 33(1) states: "Parliament or the legislature of a
province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the
Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to
15 of this Charter." A legislative override can be in effect for up to five years. Id. § 33(3).
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of judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation.' 54 Under Section 33,
Parliament and provincial legislatures have the power to pass legislation
overriding some of the key Charter provisions, in essence providing for
"legislative review of judicial review. While Section 33 has been flagged
by some as providing a prime vehicle for dialogue and shared responsibility
between courts and legislatures, 56 others argue that Section 33 has failed in
this regard and that "[s]omething like a convention against its use may have
emerged, precisely because the political costs of invoking the power turned
out to be too great.'
157
In a recent article, Professor Stephen Gardbaum argues that there is
indeed a unique relationship between courts and legislatures embedded in the
Canadian Constitution. 58 The Charter, along with the recently passed U.K.
Human Rights Act 15 9 and the New Zealand Bill of Rights, 160 protect
fundamental liberties along the lines of those protected by the U.S. Bill of
Rights and give interpretive authority over such rights to the judicial branches.
At the same time, each of these recent commonwealth bills of rights
"empower[s] legislatures to have the final word" 61-they were "self-
consciously designed to provide a new solution to the old problem of the
incompatibility of legislative supremacy and the effective (that is, judicial)
protection of fundamental rights."'
' 62
Professor Gardbaum goes on to argue that this new approach to
constitutionalism recognizes the need for dialogue and joint responsibility
between legislatures and courts in protecting fundamental liberties. He states:
"The enforced dialogue, competition, and joint responsibility between courts
and legislatures that the Commonwealth model aims to ensure promises to add
new dimension and perspective to the task of constitutional interpretation and
to enrichen the enterprise."
'163
This enforced dialogue, according to Professor Gardbaum, is an
effective compromise between legislative and judicial supremacy and "courts
might actually be emboldened in their interpretation of the content and scope
of rights" knowing that there is always the counterbalancing influence of
legislatures. 164 Alternatively, it may also embolden legislatures to respond
quickly and confidently through new substantive legislation knowing they
have the option of a full override. While there are other mechanisms for
maintaining a balance of power between courts and democratic institutions,
154. See Peter Russell, Standing Up For Notwithstanding, 29 ALBERTA L. REv. 293 (1991).
155. Peter Russell, The Effect of a Charter of Rights on the Policy-Making Role of Canadian
Courts, 25 CAN. PUB. ADMIN. 1, 32 (1982), cited in MacKay, supra note 139, at 57.
156. See Hogg & Bushell, supra note 131.
157. Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination
of the Counter-majoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REv. 245, 296 (1995).
158. Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J.
COMP. L. 707 (2001).
159. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
160. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990 (N.Z.).
161. Gardbaum, supra note 158, at 746.
162. Id. at 741.
163. Id. at 747.
164. Id. at 748.
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Professor Gardbaum argues that none are as successful as the collection of
approaches found under the emerging commonwealth model. For example,
there are comparable mechanisms for dialogue-from the judicial perspective,
restraint-under American constitutional law and theory, typically associated
with the writings of James Bradley Thayer, but they are informal and run the
risk of under-enforcement of constitutional rights.' 65 The commonwealth
model, according to Professor Gardbaum, is most effective at striking the right
balance and ensuring a robust protection of constitutional rights.
Aside from the explicit language and structure of the Canadian
Constitution, the Supreme Court of Canada has been open to, one might even
say has pursued, a dialogue or partnership with legislatures, implicitly
acknowledging the importance of democratically elected governance of
constitutional issues. A good example is the Quebec Secession case, 66 in
which the Court examined the legality of secession in both domestic and
international law. In this decision, the Court established a "legal framework"
for secession but chose not to undermine the "obligation of the elected
representatives to give concrete form to the discharge of their constitutional
obligations which only they and their electors can ultimately assess., 67 In so
deciding, the Court recognized that while it has an important role to play in
constitutional interpretation, so do political actors. The Court went on to say:
We have interpreted the questions as relating to the constitutional framework within
which political decisions may ultimately be made. Within that framework, the workings
of the political process are complex and can only be resolved by means of political
judgments and evaluations. The Court has no supervisory role over the political aspects
of constitutional negotiations. Equally, the initial impetus for negotiation, namely a clear
majority on a clear question in favour of secession, is subject only to political evaluation,
and properly so.168
While it might be tempting to discount this example as the articulation
of something like the "political question" doctrine found in U.S. constitutional
theory, there are other examples where the issue in question is clearly and
fully within the Court's jurisdiction and far from "political" in a traditional
sense. For example in, R. v. Morgentaler,169 Justice Beetz made it very clear
that while the provisions of the criminal code regulating access to an abortion
were unconstitutional, it was still within the competence of Parliament to
determine what would be a constitutional mechanism for regulation. 7' Justice
Wilson makes a similar point: "The precise point in the development of the
foetus at which the state's interest in its protection becomes 'compelling' I
leave to the informed judgment of the legislature which is in a position to
receive guidance on the subject from all the relevant disciplines."'
7
1
This approach may seem unremarkable, but it does take on new meaning
if one considers that it was decided in the wake of the comparable U.S.
165. Id. at 748-52.
166. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217
167. Id. at 271.
168. Id
169. R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
170. Id. at 128.
171. Id. at 183.
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Supreme Court decision, Roe v. Wade. 172 In that decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court not only found a provision regulating abortion unconstitutional, but
went on to determine precise rules for the constitutional regulation of
abortion. The Supreme Court of Canada cited and discussed Roe but in the
final analysis rejected its precise formula, leaving such matters to the
legislature.
While a willingness to work with Parliament is evident in Morgentaler,
Parliament ultimately failed to pass subsequent legislation regulating
abortions. In this sense, Morgentaler seems unusual. In a 1997 study,
Professors Hogg and Bushell found that eighty percent of all Charter cases in
which legislation was found to be unconstitutional were followed by some
sort of legislative response.173 For example, in R. v. Seaboyer, the Supreme
Court of Canada found the rape shield provisions of the Canadian Criminal
Code unconstitutional. 74 Consequently, Parliament responded with new
legislation that was eventually upheld in R. v. Darrach.175 While not all
legislative responses have been similarly positive, Hogg and Bushell conclude
that the rate of response is strong evidence of at least a limited dialogue
between legislative bodies and the courts.
176
There are of course examples where the Canadian Supreme Court's
interference with legislative decisions might seem to go beyond a model of
cooperation. In Vriend v. Alberta,'77 the Court chastened the Alberta
Provincial legislature for omitting "sexual orientation" as a prohibited ground
for discrimination under its Individual Rights Protection Act. 78 But even
when exercising such a broad scope of review, the Court was cautious about
appearing to overstep its authority. Justice Cory explicitly recognized the
importance of legislative deference 179 in his discussion of justiciability, as did
Justice lacobucci in his Section 1 and remedy analyses.'0 Justice Iacobucci
also spoke to and agreed with the notion of "dialogue" as a description of the
"dynamic interaction among the branches of govemance."' 8' So while the
Supreme Court of Canada may at times be aggressive in its approach to
judicial review, it is careful not to undermine what it perceives as a legitimate
role for legislative bodies in constitutional interpretation.
172. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
173. Hogg & Bushell, supra note 131, at 96-97.
174. R.v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577.
175. R. v. Darrach, [20001 2 S.C.R. 443. For a discussion of the Parliamentary consideration of
an appropriate response to Seaboyer, see Roach, supra note 16, at 524-26.
176. Hogg & Bushell, supra note 131, at 98. But see Christopher P. Manfredi & James B.
Kelly, Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to Hogg and Bushell, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 513 (1999)
(disputing the Hogg and Bushell dialogue interpretation).
177. Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (Cory, J. and lacobucci, J).
178. The Individual's Rights Protection Amendment Act, R.S.A., ch. 27 (1980) [hereinafter
"IRPA"].
179. Vriend, 1 S.C,R. at 529-30.
180. Id. at 561-66 ("[R]espect by the courts for the legislature and executive role is as
important as ensuring that the other branches respect each others' role and the role of the courts.").
181. Id. at 565. In his partial dissent, Justice Major agreed with the findings of the court but
rejected the remedy-reading "sexual orientation" into the IRPA--on the basis that "it is the
legislature's responsibility to enact legislation that embodies appropriate safeguards to comply with the
Constitution's requirements. It should not fall to the courts to fill in the details that will render legislative
lacunae constitutional." Id. at 586 (citing Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 169).
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While "dialogue" has become the dominant metaphor for understanding
the relationship between courts and legislatures in the Canadian model of
judicial review, other commentators have preferred more prosaic and arguably
more accurate terms. Professors Sujit Choudhry and Robert Howse have
labeled the Canadian approach "joint constitutional responsibility."
' 8 2
Accordingly, "U]udicial decisions only demarcate the limits of its judicial
enforcement," and beyond that "it is for the political organs of the
Constitution to frame their own interpretations of those norms and assess their
own compliance with them. Thus interpretive responsibility for particular
constitutional norms is both shared and divided."' 83 Leighton McDonald
prefers the idea of "institutional interaction." It may not, he observes, be as
"catchy, but it does usefully emphasize the contingency, complexity, and
changeability of the observed 'dialogue' without implying that Canadian
courts and legislatures are engaged in an amicable, standing seminar on rights
discourse."'8
However one wishes to label this approach, it is clear that the Supreme
Court of Canada is engaged in at least attenuated dialogue or interaction with
Canada's political and democratic institutions rather than casting itself in a
dominant, isolated role. This is undoubtedly the result of a complex
combination of historical, textual, and cultural influences. But whatever the
reason, and whether for good or for ill, 185 the Supreme Court of Canada has
developed into an institution that has much of the same authority as the U.S.
Supreme Court, and yet it exercises that authority with a different
understanding of its role in a deliberative democracy.
3. Dialogue and Comparative Reasoning
The purpose of this Section has been to piece together a number of
seemingly unconnected observations about the Supreme Court of Canada and
to construct a larger cultural description of the court. The Court in this
analysis is an institution focused on an ongoing dialogue and partnership with
both domestic and foreign legal institutions. At this point, a question that
immediately comes to mind is whether the local and foreign dialogic positions
are connected in anything more than a descriptive sense. Has the Supreme
Court of Canada's traditional openness to foreign law influenced how it deals
with local legal institutions in its judicial reasoning? The causal relation, if
there is one, is most certainly complex and multi-, rather than uni-, directional,
so it would be unwise, not to mention difficult, to argue for a causal
182. Sujit Choudhry & Robert Howse, Constitutional Theory and the Quebec Secession
Reference, 13 CAN. J.L.& JURISPRUDENCE 143, 160 (2000).
183. Id. at 160-61.
184. Leighton McDonald, Rights, "Dialogue" and Democratic Objections to Judicial Review
42 (Feb. 20, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Journal ofInternational Law).
185. While I have tended to cite scholars and studies that seem to support this dialogic model
or reject its existence, there are those who recognize it exists but find it inappropriate and weak-minded.
For a quick outline of the debate, see Kirk Makin, Has Democracy Been Dulled?, THE GLOBE AND
MAIL, Apr. 10, 2002, at A4.
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connection. Nonetheless the Supreme Court of Canada's ongoing dialogue
with foreign legal systems arguably supports its internal dialogic perspective.
The argument for this loose connection goes as follows. The
introduction of foreign law broadens the context for decision-making and as
that context grows, the usefulness and plausibility of authoritative rules with
general application become increasingly less apparent. This broader
perspective is general in nature, extending to the persuasive value of multiple
influences both foreign and domestic.
Professor Patrick Glenn comes closest to making this argument in his
discussion of "persuasive authority." Professor Glenn argues that what judges
who cite foreign law learn over a long period of time is
not to take single institutions too seriously. [Judges] are called upon to decide cases or
enact norms or give opinions, but the search for law is too important for any potential
external source to be eliminated a priori. The law is never definitively given; it is always
to be sought in the endlessly original process of resolution of individual disputes through
the law.
3 8 6
Professor Glenn goes on to comment that "multiplying the sources of
law means multiplying the sources of legal dialogue. Law is less precise but
more communal."' 187 So rather than giving law, the Supreme Court of Canada
engages other legal decision-makers in Canada in a "communal" process of
resolving disputes and refining law.
Another way to understand this connection is to look at what is said
about comparative law in general because this should have some application
to judges who choose a comparative analysis. Professor Annelise Riles
comments that "the contribution of comparative law emanates not from
pseudoscientific information gathering pretense. . . . [W]hat comparativists
share is a passion for looking beyond, an empathy for differences but also for
similarities, a faith in the self-transformative task of learning, and an interest
in the form of knowledge itself."188 If a comparative perspective involves an
appreciation of what lies "beyond" the familiar, it naturally provides a critical
perspective and a more contingent understanding of one's own approach.
What might have once appeared to be an objectively correct legal approach
begins to look more subjective requiring more open and constant discussion
and refinement. In short, a comparative perspective in widening the scope of
potential solutions encourages a rejection of rule-bound and formulaic
decision-making authority in favor of more flexible, fluid and contingent
decision-making. It is this aspect of comparative law that Professor George
Fletcher has labelled its "subversive potential." 89
Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada appears to have embraced an
"enquiry"' 190 or dialogic model of legal reasoning. It perceives enquiry and
186. Glenn, Persuasive Authority, supra note 10, at 293.
187. Id. at 297-98.
188. Annelise Riles, Wigmore's Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information, 40
HARV. INT'L L.J. 221,229 (1999).
189. George Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 683,
684(1998).
190. Glenn, Persuasive Authority, supra note 10, at 287-97.
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dialogue as essential not only to the process of forming law but additionally to
the authority of law itself. Legal decisions under this model are legitimated by
the input of multiple voices, rather than through restrictions on the sources of
law. The Court sees itself not as a creator or discoverer of exclusively local
standards but rather as an institution deeply connected to a host of other
institutions, some existing within the Canadian constitutional framework,
others existing outside that framework, but all joined in a collective and
ongoing process of refinement. While the current tendencies of the Court are
deeply connected with its history-and it has, as stated earlier, always used
foreign law-my observations here are limited to the recent history of the
Court, in particular the post-Charter years.
B. The Enforcement Model
As stated in the introduction to this Section, the enforcement model' 91 is
based on a preference for local, independent, and final decision-making.
Under such a model, the focus is less on dialogue and more on finality. The
following Section will explore how this model of judicial review emerges
from the attitude of the current U.S. Supreme Court concerning both foreign
law and domestic legal institutions.
1. Foreign Law and the Problem of Coherence
As discussed in Part I of this paper, the U.S. Supreme Court is generally
disinclined to discuss or cite foreign law. While some Justices of the Supreme
Court have indicated a willingness to cite foreign law, the limited number of
foreign references indicates a distinct lack of institutional enthusiasm. The
terms of this rejection, however, are as important to this analysis as the
rejection itself. What appears to drive the Court's rejection of foreign law is
less a question of the wisdom of foreign legal options and more a question of
the importance of local accountability. With local accountability as the focus
of concern, foreign law not only becomes irrelevant, but the mere suggestion
of it becomes a threat to the supposed integrity of the system.
Again, consider Justice Thomas's rejection of foreign law in Knight v.
Moore. As previously mentioned, Justice Thomas stated that the petitioners'
use of foreign law was itself a clear indication of the lack of local legal
support for their argument. If we consider this position for a moment, it
becomes clear that foreign law under Justice Thomas's reasoning is and will
always be inconsistent with local authority: the mere introduction of foreign
law is the source of its own demise as persuasive authority. Put another way,
foreign and domestic law are mutually exclusive sources of law. This
argument has very little to do with the quality or persuasive value of any
191. Harold Krent has written about the U.S. Supreme Court as an "enforcement agency," and
there are some parallels in his arguments and the arguments made here. But in general, Krent is focused
more on how the Court engages in strategic behavior that is similar to that of an administrative agency
acting in its enforcement capacity-in essence under or over enforcing constitutional rights for strategic
purposes. See Harold J. Krent, The Supreme Court as an Enforcement Agency, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1149 (1998).
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specific foreign law and everything to do with its pedigree-its foreignness
strips it of any authority in domestic legal disputes. It is inherently irrelevant.
The same argument surfaces in Justice Scalia's frequently cited rejection
of foreign law in Printz v. United States: "comparative analysis [is]
inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution."' 92 Justice Scalia is
very clear here. His opinion is not obfuscated by statements about the wisdom
or usefulness of foreign law-it is simply "inappropriate."
193
There are of course other voices on the U.S. Supreme Court. As already
mentioned, Justice Breyer is comfortable with the use of foreign law in
specific circumstances and has openly argued for its relevance. Professor
Mark Tushnet has argued that Justice Breyer seems to be adopting a
"functionalist" approach to constitutional interpretation, whereas Justice
Scalia seems to be taking an "organicist" approach. 94 The continuing lack of
foreign law in U.S. Supreme Court opinions seems to indicate that the
"organicists" are winning, or at least dominating. But the question remains:
What does this "organicist" approach tell us about the U.S. Supreme Court, or
at least those Justices who hold firmly to it?
Professor Tushnet has explained that "a strong organicist position"
views the Constitution, in fact all constitutions, as springing from local
circumstances. Only local political and civil culture as reflected in ongoing
legal interpretation counts. But the desire of "organicists" to construct an
impermeable boundary around constitutional law is not explicable simply on
the grounds of parochialism or political conservatism. Neither of these
explanations fully accounts for the terms upon which foreign law is rejected.
Rather, in tracing the legal boundaries so precisely over national boundaries,
Justice Scalia, the most vocal "organicist," seems to be expressing concern
about legitimacy and its dependence on coherence.
There is a huge amount at stake here for the "strong organicist." If
constitutional interpretation is untethered from its local context there is a risk
that it will appear more arbitrary, less clearly the instantiation of truths already
embedded in the Constitution. Constitutional interpretation begins to look
more like constitutional policy-making, unrestrained by precedent, text, and
other traditional (and binding) sources of authority. This in turn undermines
the existing coherence and thus authority of the system. In short, the concern
is that foreign law will undermine the reality and idea of internal coherence
upon which local legal authority is based. 195
Key to this concern is the assumption that a true or correct legal
proposition does not relate or correspond to any outside facts about the world
but rather to the source of the proposition itself. If the meaning of a legal
proposition depends exclusively on references to the legally specified
authoritative source of that proposition rather than a host of external
influences, then legal interpretation becomes suitably independent and self-
192. 521 U.S. 898,921 n.1 1(1997).
193. Id.
194. Mark Tushnet, Returning with Interest: Observations on Some Putative Benefits of
Studying Comparative Constitutional Law, I U. PA. J. CONST. L. 325, 333-34 (1998).
195. 1 owe an enormous debt to my student Jon Neuleib for his assistance with this argument.
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referential, rather than dependent on the personal views of the decision-maker.
The coercive nature of judicial pronouncements, so the argument goes,
requires this level of independence and internal coherence. While I am
ascribing this view to the "strong organicist's" rejection of foreign law, it can
also be used to describe other elements of Justice Scalia's approach to
constitutional interpretation, including originalism.1
96
While the "organicist" position fits comfortably with formalism, it is
also heavily focused on coherence; the answer to the question "What counts as
law or legal analysis?" is not only limited to language and arguments internal
to the law broadly speaking. It is further limited to only those legal ideas
connected with local binding authority. 197 The conception of coherence here is
important. Coherence, as Wittgenstein explains in his early works, is a
question more of intent than of description. 198 A system--e.g., a legal or
constitutional system-coheres when those participating in its creation intend
to account for all the relevant facts and experiences. Like all grammars, our
legal and constitutional system has a totalizing intent. The danger, then, from
the perspective of someone like Justice Scalia, is not just the problems of
interpretation involved in drawing on foreign law; the danger is that in
drawing on these sources we undermine the intent and thus call into question
the legitimacy of the structure as a whole. In short, reference to foreign law
entails accepting and thus revealing inadequacies in local law, and this in turn
poses risks for the legitimacy and authority of binding local law.
Neither Justice Scalia nor others on the Court have explicitly connected
their rejection of foreign law to concerns about internal coherence (although
this is the most plausible explanation for Justice Thomas's statement in
Knight). Nonetheless this does help explain variations or inconsistencies in
what have been termed "intermestic"1 99 cases-cases with both international
and domestic elements. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council20 ° is a
good example. In Crosby, the Court rejected a Massachusetts law concerning
trade with Burma on the basis that the law in question was preempted by
subsequently passed federal legislation imposing sanctions on trade and
business with Burma. The case, as Professor Tushnet notes, is a departure
from the Court's federalism decisions, 20 1 leading one to speculate that the
international nature of the case prompted the court to prefer greater
centralization of authority. While there are numerous plausible explanations
196. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Coherentism, 50 SMU L. REV. 1679, 1682-95 (1997)
(discussing the various jurisprudential responses to the cluster of ideas associated with the
correspondence theory of truth, including originalism). See also id. at 1693 (discussing originalism
specifically).
197. This is different from the legal coherentism defined in Zipursky's article. See supra note
196. He outlines an approach that regards "legal discourse as autonomous," not in need of arguments
from economics, philosophy, or other external disciplines. But, he argues, this approach can encompass
a broad range of ideas about legal reasoning, unlike the limited understanding of law found in formalist
legal thinking. Id. at 1681, 1705-07.
198. LUDWIG WiTTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS (1922)
199. Mark Tushnet, Globalization and Federalism in a Post-Printz World, 36 TULSA L.J. 11,
15 (2000).
200. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
201. Tushnet, supra note 199, at 26.
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202for the Court's decision in this case, one partial explanation is that the Court
was concerned about maintaining internal coherence on matters of foreign
affairs. When the issue involves foreign affairs, speaking in one voice
becomes important not only because of the strength and unity that is inherent
in one voice but, more importantly, because many voices will reveal the lack
of authority in any one voice.
This interpretation of the "organicist" position, particularly as articulated
by Justice Scalia, also finds support in the circumstances under which Justice
Scalia views foreign law to be relevant. First, he admitted in Printz that
foreign law might indeed be relevant to the drafting or designing of a
constitution. °3 Second, he has said repeatedly in extrajudicial statements that
a transnational judicial dialogue outside of decision-making is fine.204 It
simply has no place in the Court's actual decisions or formal judicial
reasoning. These points are very revealing, for they indicate that the
boundaries being drawn map onto the boundaries of existing and formal
constitutional law and relate directly to the Court's official authority. Once the
constitutional system is in place, it alone must provide the answer to all formal
constitutional queries and issues. The fact that it must provide all answers
naturally transforms into a belief that it indeed does provide all answers.20 5
Foreign law thus becomes unnecessary and even threatening to a belief in the
authority of the Constitution.
There is an important weakness in this argument in that it depends
almost exclusively on statements made by Justice Scalia. Is it legitimate to pin
Justice Scalia's views about foreign law on the rest of the Court, or at least on
those Justices who have shown no serious interest in using foreign law in their
judicial reasoning? The answer is probably no. Yet, given the lack of any
other explicit statements from the Court, it is hard to know how else to explain
the lack of enthusiasm for foreign law. Clearly the Justices that have not shied
away from foreign law, specifically Justices Breyer and Stevens, are
exceptions. In addition, the statements of other Justices indicate they do not
wish to be associated with the extreme position of Justice Scalia. Yet to the
extent that there continues to be reticence concerning the citation or
discussion of foreign law in most areas falling under the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction, Justice Scalia's explanation seems as valid as any others that we
might hypothesize.
Thus anxiety and concern about coherence help explain at least the
"strong organicist" position and perhaps has some application to those less
clearly in the "strong organicist" category. But how does this relate to what I
202. See id at 38-41.
203. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.1 1 (1997).
204. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Program V Commentary, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1119, 1122
(1996) ("I welcome international conferences ... in which the judges of various countries may exchange
useful insights and information, and, by association with their colleagues in the law, may strengthen
their sense of dignity and independence.").
205. The dispute in Printz between Justices Breyer and Scalia over the use of foreign law was
in the context of a disagreement over whether there was any local authority on the issue. Justice Breyer
believed that local authority was wanting; Justice Scalia disagreed. See Tushnet, supra note 194, at 326
n.9.
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have labeled an enforcement model? The clear demarcation of what is in and
what is out, I have argued, stems from a desire to understand the internal legal
system as coherent, and upon this foundation rests the law's authority. It is a
rejection of the existence and even the possibility of ambiguity. When these
ideas are understood in the context of the Supreme Court, Constitutional
interpretation and decision-making becomes primarily a process of
enforcement. Enforcement implies not only a process of finding and applying
the existing coherent body of law rather than making new law; it further
presumes a sense of final and conclusive authority.
However one explains the isolationist or "organicist" tendencies in U.S.
Supreme Court constitutional interpretation, such tendencies are arguably not
random but are part of a larger model of decision-making. Just as it was
possible to draw connections in the Canadian context between the use of
foreign law and other aspects of judicial reasoning, so it is possible in the U.S.
context. These connections will be discussed in the next Section.
2. Lower Courts, Legislatures, and Supreme Authority
The arguments at the foundation of the "strong organicist" rejection of
foreign law are also apparent in other aspects of its jurisprudence and legal
reasoning. These aspects are only roughly diametrically opposed to those
addressed in the section on the Supreme Court of Canada. So while the
Supreme Court of Canada has a less clear-cut and distinctly non-authoritative
relationship with legislatures, it could be argued that the U.S. Supreme Court
has clearly established its authority over such bodies. The rules/standards
debate is less helpful here because the U.S. Supreme Court seems to evade
definition on these terms. But the Court has in other more direct ways defined
itself as clearly above lower courts rather than in partnership with them. These
trends may not fully describe or explain the attitudes of all those on the
Rehnquist Court, but they are nonetheless generally associated with the
current U.S. Supreme Court and they contribute to an overall picture of that
Court's jurisprudence and attitude.
a. Rules, Standards, Minimalism, and Authority
The rules/standards debate has been a peculiar fascination of U.S.
constitutional and Supreme Court theory. The work of Professor Frederick
Schauer has generated a robust, abstract jurisprudential debate about the value
of rules versus principles or standards. As perhaps the most prominent
defender of rules, he has attracted a host of both admirers and detractors. °6
But the more interesting debate for the purposes of this paper is how these
concepts apply to the Rehnquist court. In a prior Section this article has
argued that the Supreme Court of Canada tends toward the use of standards in
its judicial decision-making. Does the current U.S. Supreme Court favor the
use of rules?
206. See, e.g., Symposium, The Works of Frederick Schauer, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. (2000);
RULES AND REASONING; ESSAYS IN HONOR OF FRED SCHAUER (Linda Meyer ed., 1999).
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The answer is, predictably, yes and no. Certainly Justice Scalia is a
strong advocate of clear, direct binding rules and has stated so in his
decisions 207 as well as in his academic writing.208 Justice Thomas seems to be
following Justice Scalia's lead, and Chief Justice Rehnquist also tends to favor
the use of rules. 209 But what of the others? Where do they lie on the
rules/standards continuum?
According to Professor Sullivan, the centrist contingent on the Court
(Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter) lean more toward the use of
standards in their decisions. In fact, central to Professor Sullivan's argument is
a connection between the use of standards and political moderation. At the
time Professor Sullivan was writing, Justice Stevens was the strongest
210advocate of the use of standards. Since Professor Sullivan's article, Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer have been added to the Court and both seem to side with
those favoring standards.211 Justice Breyer, perhaps more vocally than any
others, has embraced a "democratic" approach to constitutional interpretation
and adjudication that is skeptical of a "literalist" and rule-bound approach to
judicial reasoning and decision-making.
212
So this window into the jurisprudence of the current Court sheds little
light on the question of the relationship of the U.S. Supreme Court to other
courts, most particularly the federal judiciary. The Court appears to be
significantly and very vocally split on the question of rules versus standards.
Another prominent theory of recent constitutional decision-making by the
U.S. Supreme Court that has implications for questions of authority over
lower courts is Professor Cass Sunstein's "minimalism. '21 3 Minimalism, an
idea that stresses the limited nature of judicial inquiry as it relates to both the
facts before it ("width") and basic principles ("depth"), is, according to
Professor Sunstein, "democracy-promoting" precisely because it leaves so
much to be resolved by lower courts, future courts, and legislatures.
214
Professor Sunstein states: "Minimalist judges ... try to reduce the burdens of
judgment for the Supreme Court justices, to minimize the risks of error
introduced by broad rules and abstract theories, and to maximize the space for
democratic deliberation about basic political and moral issues.' 215 If indeed
207. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 932 ("[W]here ... it is the whole object of the law to direct the
functioning of the state executive... balancing analysis is inappropriate."); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 733 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("A government of laws means a government of rules.").
208. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
209. Sullivan, supra note 113, at 83-88 (discussing Justice Scalia).
210. Id. at 88-95.
211. See Spencer Overton, Rules, Standards, and Bush v. Gore: Form and the Law of
Democracy, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 75-78 (2002) (pointing out that in Bush v. Gore, Justices
Ginsburg, Stevens, Breyer and Souter all rejected the application of a rigid rule but recognizing that all
of the Justices employed a mix of "traditional rules and standards arguments in analyzing the legal
issues in the case").
212. See Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, Fall 2001 James Madison Lecture,
New York University School of Law, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp1 0-22-01 .html.
213. See generally CASS R. SUI'STEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided].
214. SUNSTEIN, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 213, at 24-25.
215. Id. at99.
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the Court is leaning in this direction then it could be said that the Court is
limiting rather than trying to reinforce its authority over the resolution of
constitutional issues, particularly in relation to other courts.
But there are some important distinctions between minimalism and the
standard-based or balancing approach to decision-making that the Supreme
Court of Canada appears to follow. Standard or principle-based legal
reasoning proceeds on the assumption that setting out a general framework for
legal reasoning in future cases is important. So while such an approach does
not anticipate the same constraining effect as a rule-based approach, it would
be incorrect to describe it as a narrow form of decision-making. On the other
hand, the virtue of minimalism as advocated by Professor Sunstein is indeed
its limited and narrow nature-an "appreciation of the passive virtues" of the
Court.216 While both of these approaches might be "democracy-promoting"
they rest on separate foundations. Minimalism is meant to be democracy-
promoting because the court takes a back seat in setting policy, restricting
itself to the limited role of resolving specific disputes. It relies very much on
the importance of separation between various forms and levels of legal
institutions. Standard-based decision-making assumes more of an active
cooperation and partnership model. Standards do indeed provide much
material for future decision-making but they nonetheless promote dialogue
between courts because they remain flexible and stop short of explicitly
constraining lower and future courts.
This is a subtle, and some might even find picky, self-serving
distinction, and I certainly do not wish to enter into a debate about which of
these approaches is indeed better at promoting democracy. My only point is
that minimalism as a theory of adjudication is less focused on direct dialogue
than a standard-based approach and consequently has less bearing on the
relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts.
If we turn away from abstract theories of adjudication toward more
direct statements, there is ample support for characterizing the U.S. Supreme
Court as being more concerned with enforcement than dialogue when it comes
to lower courts. The Court has itself explicitly stated that under no
circumstances are lower courts to rule contrary to a direct Supreme Court
precedent, even when good reasons and respect for subsequent Supreme Court
decisions might dictate such action. For example, in Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson, Justice Kennedy for the Court stated, "If a precedent of this Court
has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some
other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions., 21 7 It should be noted that the Court did indeed affirm the Appeals
Court decision in this case while nonetheless scolding it for its impudence.
218
216. Id. at 8 n.8 (recognizing the connections and distinctions between the theory he presents
and that put forth by Alexander Bickel in The Least Dangerous Branch).
217. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson, 490 U.S. 477,484 (1989).
218. The double-sided nature of this decision-both affirming and rebuking-make it a classic
example of Frederick Schauer's defense of formalism. Formalism, according to Schauer is primarily
about limiting the options of other decision-makers to reduce the risk of error. Thus the U.S. Supreme
Court as a final decision-maker or policy-maker should be concerned about departures from its
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The dissent in this case was equally incensed at the actions of the Court of
Appeals.219 This decision is now more than a decade old but the Court has not
changed in this respect. The statement of Justice Kennedy has been cited and
affirmed in more recent cases220 and the Court has engaged in direct debates
with at least the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit regarding judicial
discretion and authority.22'
On one level the statement of the Rodriguez court is nothing more than a
truism. Stare decisis is a defining feature of all common law systems and
accordingly lower courts must follow the dictates of higher courts as they
appear in precedents. But such an explicit and aggressive show of authority is
arguably a recent and questionable development. 222 Professor Ashutosh
Bhagwat writes that for the Court to have the final word on its own authority
is itself problematic in the absence of any other checks or balances.
223
Additionally, Professor Bhagwat argues, it limits the legitimate participation
of other courts in the ongoing evolution of legal norms. He states:
Instead of viewing the exercise of the judicial power as a cooperative venture in reasoned
decision-making and precedent-building, where there is value to be gained from
participation by all levels of the judiciary, the Court increasingly seems to see it as an
exercise of raw power, so that any sharing of that power is necessarily at the expense of
the Court's own authority.
224
There are deep and complicated questions about the legitimacy of this
increasingly aggressive display of authority but whatever one thinks of it, the
fact of it remains. The Court has assumed a more explicit position of authority
and control over lower courts.
Another example of the Court's increasing concerns about authority can
be found in a recent article by Professor Laura Fitzgerald. Under the title
"Suspecting the States," Professor Fitzgerald argues that while the Court has
significantly immunized state courts and laws from Congressional challenges
and lower federal court review, the Court has extended its own powers of
review. Without any reason "to suspect [the] state court of having evaded or
otherwise cheated federal law," 225 the Court has assumed the right to review
directives even when it ultimately agrees with the basis for that departure. Frederick Schauer,
Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988).
219. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 486 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court of Appeals therefore
engaged in an indefensible brand ofjudicial activism.").
220. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 214 (1997).
221. See Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998) (holding that the 9th Circuit abused its
discretion when it sua sponte recalled its mandate to revisit the merits of an earlier decision denying
habeas relief to a state prisoner); Vasquez v. Harris, 503 U.S. 1000 (1992) (vacating a 9th Circuit stay of
execution and prohibiting any further stays of Harris's execution by the federal courts except upon order
of the Supreme Court).
222. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate But Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal
Courts and the Nature of the "Judicial Power," 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 968-77 (2000) (discussing
Rodriguez and other cases in which the Court has reprimanded or even interfered with the exercise of
judicial authority in lower federal courts). But see Harold Krent, The Supreme Court as an Enforcement
Agency, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1149, 1201-02 (1998) (arguing that such strong assertions of authority
might be necessary for uniformity at least in the context of "overenforced" constitutional norms).
223. Bhagwat, supra note 222, at 1010-13.
224. Id. at 978.
225. Laura Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court Review of State-Court State-Law
Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REV. 80, 84 (2002).
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"state-law decision[s] that [block] a state court from considering a federal
claim. 2 26 The salience of Fitzgerald's primary observations is hard to resist:
while the Court expects other courts and Congress to give states the benefit of
the doubt, the Court itself has adopted no such standard when it comes to state
court review.
So while the minimalist or standard-based decision-making of some
members of the Court might be a sign of movement towards a less dominating
Supreme Court, explicit statements by the Court limiting the interpretive role
of lower federal courts and even state courts seem aimed at reinforcing its
dominance.
b. The Supreme Court as a Supreme Institution
So far I have tried to argue that the reasons for rejecting foreign law-
concerns about coherence and authority-are also reflected in the Court's
attitude to other domestic courts. In both contexts the Court is focused on
limiting the influence and/or discretion of other courts. The same dynamic
appears in the Court's relationship with legislatures.
Debates about the relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court and
legislative bodies have flourished since John Marshall's declaration in
Marbury v. Madison that the Supreme Court has the power to invalidate
legislation found by the Court to be unconstitutional. 2 7 Aggressive
interpreters and defenders of this power have argued that ultimate
constitutional authority must rest with the courts as the only effective
institution to protect minorities from the tyranny of the majority. 228 On the
other hand, more conservative interpreters of the power of judicial review
have argued that such power, a clear contradiction of the democratic process,
should be exercised sparingly, only in cases of clear and convincing
constitutional error.229 But most participants in this debate agree that Congress
is indeed a coequal branch of government and respect for democracy requires
some deference to its legislative enactments. For most of its history, the U.S.
Supreme Court has agreed with this and "respect for Congress has been
regularly voiced., 230 This however, may no longer be the case.
The scholarship on this question has primarily focused on the demise of
the political question doctrine, most evident in the Court's interference in the
2312000 presidential election. What makes that particular episode in Supreme
Court jurisprudence so interesting is not just that the Court interfered when
many thought the matter lay within the competence and authority of the
Florida legislature, but that the Court, as Professor Rachel Barkow argues,
"never seemed to consider that the matter could be decided by a body other
226. Id. at 83.
227. Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 177 (1803).
228. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
229. See, e.g., JAMES B. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL (1901).
230. Ruth Colker & James Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REv. 80, 89 (2001).
231. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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than a court., 2 32 While Professor Barkow falls short of calling this
institutional arrogance, she does argue that this assumption of jurisdiction,
framed as an obligation to resolve all constitutional issues, flies in the face of
the "whole point of the political question doctrine... that some issues are for
the political branches, not the federal judiciary, to confront and resolve."
233
The demise of the political question doctrine puts jurisdictional
questions at the heart of the tensions between the Court and legislative bodies,
but, as Professor Barkow argues, this is part of a "broader trend in which the
Court overestimates its own powers and prowess vis-A-vis the political
branches.' 234 Just as the Court has concocted jurisdictional supremacy at the
expense of the political question doctrine, so it has developed an "inflated
opinion of its own interpretive powers. 235
Professor Barkow is not alone in her observations. Professors Ruth
Colker and James Brudney argue that since 1995 the U.S. Supreme Court has
moved away from a position of respect and deference towards skepticism
about the scope of congressional authority. This is particularly prominent in
the Court's decisions dealing with the Commerce Clause and Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment. While the classic understanding of this
skepticism is a renewed interest in federalism, Professors Colker and Brudney
argue that this is an incomplete explanation: "The repeated abrogation of
federal statutes-including statutes expressly supported by the States
themselves-has resulted in a considerable transfer of power to the
,,236judiciary. In a subsequent article, Professor Colker, writing with Keith
Scott, further supports her argument in an empirical study of the Court's
record of invalidating state action. She concludes that the "federalism" label
cannot, on its own, explain the Court's record on invalidation. "Conservative
ideology" and the concomitant interest in greater control over sensitive
Constitutional issues is equally apparent in the cases.
237
While there are many cases that are used to support the argument that
the Court is attempting to expand its influence over Congress,2P one of the
most prominent displays of judicial supremacy can be found in City of Boerne
v. Flores.239 What makes this a particularly strong example is not that the
Court struck down federal legislation it found unconstitutionally interfered
with State powers of regulation (in itself not unusual), nor that it rejected
congressional interference in an area upon which the Court had already
232. Rachel Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine
and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 299 (2002).
233. Id. at 300.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Colker & Brudney, supra note 230, at 144.
237. Ruth Colker & Kevin Scott, Dissing States? Invalidation of State Action During the
Rehnquist Era, 88 VA. L. REv. 1301, 1371 (2002).
238. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. Of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Fl. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
239. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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spoken,240 but that it did so with insistent expressions of the supremacy of
judicial interpretations. In writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy stated:
When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province of the
Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is. When the political
branches of the Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the
Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and controversies the
Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles,
including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed. 241
Aside from the cases, Professors Colker and Brudney draw direct support for
their argument from the extra-judicial comments of Justice Scalia:
My Court is fond of saying that acts of Congress come to the Court with the presumption
of constitutionality . . . But if Congress is going to take the attitude that it will do
anything it can get away with and let the Supreme Court worry about the Constitution...
then perhaps that presumption is unwarranted.
242
Perhaps the most thorough and trenchant critique of the shift in judicial
review engineered by the Rehnquist Court comes from Professor Larry
Kramer. In the introduction to his review of the 2000 Supreme Court term,
Professor Kramer states, "The Rehnquist Court no longer views itself as first
among equals, but has instead staked its claim to being the only institution
empowered to speak with authority when it comes to the meaning of the
Constitution. '" 243 This shift in power, argues Professor Kramer, fundamentally
contradicts and undermines the historically and normatively favored notion of
"popular constitutionalism" which embraces shared interpretive responsibility.
This is not simply a shift in politics, argues Professor Kramer, but rather a
shift in the entire meaning of constitutionalism: "The Rehnquist Court's
activism explicitly denies the people any role in determining the ongoing
meaning of their Constitution, other than by the grace of the Justices
themselves.
'" 244
While all of the above scholars have expressed concern about this
change in attitude, my purpose in reviewing this material is not to join the
chorus of criticism. While I lean towards supporting Professor Kramer's
critique of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, I have neither the expertise
nor space to enter into this hugely significant constitutional debate.245 But
240. The federal legislation in question in Boerne was the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993 which was passed in direct response to Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), in
which the court upheld against a free exercise challenge a state law of general applicability criminalizing
peyote use, as applied to deny unemployment benefits to Native American church members who lost
their jobs because of such use.
241. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. See also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 63 ("The ultimate interpretation and
determination of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive meaning remains the province of the Judicial
Branch."); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 ("It is the responsibility of this Court, not Congress, to define the
substance of constitutional guarantees.").
242. Colker & Brudney, supra note 230, at 80 (quoting Antonin Scalia, Speaking at the
Telecommunications Law and Policy Symposium (Apr. 18, 2000)).
243. Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L.
REv. 4, 14 (2001).
244. Id. at 130.
245. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation,
110 HARV. L. REv. 1359 (1997), for a strong defense ofjudicial supremacy.
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whether one agrees or disagrees with the attitudes of the current Court, its
presumption of superiority is evident and that is all that counts for my present
purposes. The significant increase in instances where the Court has
invalidated federal legislation (not always contrary to states' interests) in
terms that convey its sense of superiority speaks volumes about its skepticism
of congressional competence. 246 While some of this can legitimately find
refuge under the protection of states' rights, this neither fully explains the
cases nor the terms the court has chosen. So while there may be legitimate
disputes about the pros and cons of the Court's increased hostility to
Congress, the hostility itself is hard to dispute.
The notion of dialogue in U.S. constitutional decision-making is not
foreign to the Court or commentaries about constitutional decision-making.
247
But one of the dominant themes in current constitutional scholarship is that
there is a tendency on the part of the Rehnquist Court to establish a monopoly
on constitutional interpretation, to articulate a "juricentric" vision of the
Constitution, 248 or to adhere to a strong form of judicial supremacy. 249 Not
only, then, is the Court unwilling to engage in a dialogue about the meaning
and content of constitutional provisions, it has insisted on overseeing and
setting the terms for all constitutional analysis. It has rejected congressional
input not because it is "illogical," but because it has not been amenable to
Court review. According to Professor Kramer, the Supreme Court has
unequivocally established that:
Rules that do not enable the Supreme Court sufficiently to control the substantive
meaning of the Constitution... are rules that need to be changed. This is true whether
they are rules of process (such as standard of review) or rules of substance (such as the
scope of equal protection or the reach of the Commerce Clause). What matters, above all,
246. See Colker & Brudney, supra note 230, at 87-105 (detailing the increase in statutory
invalidation-or "new judicial activism"). See also Timothy Zick, Marbury Ascendant: The Rehnquist
Court and the Power To "Say What the Law Is," 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 839 (2002) (arguing that the
Court's recent Section 5 jurisprudence reflects an overall decline in deference to Congress).
Interestingly, Zick also discusses a similar decline in deference in the Court's decisions reviewing the
actions of executive agencies.
247. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 655-59
(1993) (discussing dialogue between courts and legislatures); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power 78 INDIANA
L.J. (forthcoming 2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstractid=378500 (discussing the dialogue
between U.S. Supreme Court interpretation of the Constitution and the constitutional ideals embraced by
the nation during the 1960s and the following decades, particularly with respect to Section 5 legislation.)
248. Post & Siegel, supra note 247, at 17-30 (electronic copy).
249. Here, I am relying on the definition of judicial supremacy recently provided by Keith
Whittington. There are multiple elements to his definition, but the part that is most applicable here is as
follows:
Judicial supremacy requires deference by other government officials to the
constitutional dictates of the Court, even when other government officials think that
the Court is substantively wrong about the meaning of the Constitution and in
circumstances that are not subject to judicial review. Likewise, judicial supremacy
requires that other government officials regard judicial opinions as generative,
binding not merely in a particular case, but indicating correct constitutional principles
that may apply in a wide variety of future, not-yet contemplated cases.
Keith E.Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80
N.C. L. REv. 773, 784 (2002).
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3. Coherence and Authority
All of these elements combined give one the impression that the U.S.
Supreme Court views itself not as a mediator or partner in an active dialogue
but rather as a local law enforcer in the strictest sense. Through direct
assertions of authority over both legislative bodies and lower courts, the Court
has established itself as very much the final, and if we follow Professor
Kramer's arguments, exclusive authority in constitutional interpretation. Its
refusal to engage foreign legal systems arguably stems from similar concerns
about maintaining a tight grip on authority.
The connections between questions of internal and external authority
should be evident. Again, without making any claims about their causal
relation, they share common foundational concerns about coherence and
legitimacy. The U.S. Supreme Court is consistent in its belief that restricting
the sources of legal ideas and the ultimate authority for constitutional
interpretation is essential to the maintenance of a coherent body of law. In this
way, the enforcement model rests on the presumption that limitations in
sources and a well-defined legal hierarchy are essential to the coherence of
constitutional interpretation. Coherence and thus legitimacy under this model
are secured through structural constraints rather than rational argumentation or
persuasive reasoning. In short, ensuring coherence through the limiting of
sources and participants, rather than persuasion through dialogue, is at the
heart of the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to judicial review.
The argument for the existence of common underlying ideas in all the
elements of the enforcement model is further generated and supported by the
fact that one Justice is most vocal on all counts. Justice Scalia is the most
adamant defender of rule-like legal reasoning, the superiority of the Supreme
Court on constitutional interpretation and the rejection of foreign law. The
mere fact that the enforcement model in all its elements is most strongly and
explicitly represented by the judicial reasoning of one Justice suggests at least
a presumptive connection between the various elements.
There is also a more theoretical connection here. The notion that
structural constraints rather than rational argumentation or persuasive
reasoning are key to legitimate decision-making is entirely in keeping with
Justice Scalia's other interpretative commitments-textualism and
originalism. 251 While these separate theories of, respectively, statutory and
constitutional interpretation are different, the former emphasizing plain
meanings and literal applications, the latter historical or "original" meanings,
they each derive strength from a belief in pre-existing, limited and extra-
judicial constraints252 on judicial reasoning. Both theories are formalist 253 and
250. Kramer, supra note 243, at 153.
251. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997).
252. But note here that the extrajudicial constraints in question are not institutional-that is
coming from the other branches of government-but textual and historical, and as such still entirely
dependent on judicial interpretation.
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as such view the legitimacy of the Court resting fundamentally on the
structural and presumably neutral constraints on its judicial reasoning and
decision-making powers. To broaden both the types and sources of legal
arguments, as well as legal directives, leaves decision-making too open-ended,
and, as such, susceptible to the subjective normative leanings of individual
judges. The concern is that this in turn will lead to claims of incoherence and
illegitimacy.
As in the section on the dialogic model, I wish to avoid overstating the
connection here. While the rejection of foreign law by most of the current
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court sits comfortably with other aspects of its
approach to decision-making and indeed, I have argued they seem to share
common theoretical foundations, proving the existence of a more solid link is
beyond the scope of this Article and may, in fact, be very difficult. The
arguments set out above establish a loose connection, but in doing so support
something more than a coincidence. The rejection of foreign law is thus not an
isolated issue or simply a question of parochialism, but is arguably connected
to and supported by other elements in the pattern of judicial reasoning and the
model of judicial supremacy currently embraced by the U.S. Supreme Court.
While there may be continuities between this approach and the history of the
U.S. Supreme Court, my comments here are intended to apply only to the
current Court, or more broadly, the Rehnquist court.254
IV. LEGITIMACY AND LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY-CONCERNS ABOUT
DIALOGUE AND COMPARATIVE REASONING
The question that remains is, "So what?" The Supreme Court of Canada
leans toward a dialogic model of judicial reasoning, while the U.S. Supreme
Court prefers an enforcement model. Does this matter beyond simply
understanding the cultures of these two institutions? In particular, is anything
to be gained or lost from adopting the comparative perspective embedded in
the dialogic model?
Given the extent to which these models reflect deep cultural and
historical differences in the two courts and the broader legal systems, it is
probably unwise to argue strongly for one model over another. The current
253. A label that Scalia does not shy away from. See SCALIA, supra note 251, at 25.
254. Those well-versed in comparative law might find my analysis at this point in conflict with
Professor Mirjan Damaska's discussion of the "hierarchical ideal" and the "coordinate ideal,"
respectively mapping on to civil and common law systems of adjudication. See MIRJAN R. DAMASKA,
THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY (1986). The American system under this model is more
consistent with the "coordinate ideal." But I have described the U.S. Supreme Court, a key part of the
American legal system, as more hierarchical or vertical in its thinking. There are three responses to this
issue. First, Professor Damaska is comparing entire systems, whereas I am only looking at a small, albeit
important, piece. Second, Professor Damaska's analysis focuses more on structures and formal lines of
authority, whereas I am interested more in informal attitudes with respect to exercising that authority.
Finally, it may be the case that within the common law generally speaking, some legal systems might be
more "coordinate" than others. Oddly, Canada is more hierarchical in its formal structure with a single
unified system of adjudication compared to the American approach with its parallel (state/federal)
systems of authority. But again, the formal structure of authority and the exercise of authority under that
structure are different questions.
255. This is indeed the age-old problem in comparative law, how to get beyond the subjective
Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review
Canadian approach certainly reflects a history of Parliamentary sovereignty,
something conspicuously absent in American constitutional history. In
addition, the openness of the Canadian Court may have something to do with
Canada's history of cultural compromise, the legacy of a strong French
Canadian community.
6
The jurisdictional differences of the two courts may also play a
significant role. One commentator has suggested that the U.S. Supreme
Court's concern about maintaining authority is necessary precisely because it
has a narrower jurisdiction than the Canadian Court-when it speaks it needs
to speak with greater force to provide some semblance of coherence in the
midst of a jumble of state and federal jurisdictions. 257 Even the current and
quite different geopolitical strengths of both countries may have an impact on
the questions addressed; it is not hard to see parallels in the unilateralism of
the Court and the current Bush Administration.
So there are many reasons for caution in arguing for one model over
another. But there is enough interest in the use of comparative law even from
some of the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court to explore some central
concerns about the comparative/dialogic approach, concerns that are reflected
in the enforcement model. There are two sets of concerns I would like to
explore here. The first deals with the maintenance of traditional common law
norms. The second is the appropriate balance between global and local
contexts for decision-making.
A. Traditional Common Law Norms
Constitutional adjudication generates its own set of norms and methods,
but within common law systems, it is also influenced by traditional common
law methodological concerns. Common law decision-making traditionally has
been highly focused on precedent and dependent on uniformity, predictability,
and certainty. These features have indeed become the hallmarks of the
common law; while it proceeds and builds on a case-by-case basis, always
moving forward, its authority is constantly being rooted in what has already
been laid down. It is the backward-looking and seemingly constrained aspect
of this Janus-like common law, embodied in the notion of stare decisis, that
generates expectations of uniformity. As the final interpreters of law, judges
have supreme authority, but they must, in principle, adhere to the constraints
imposed by earlier cases. Pre-existing law in the form of binding precedent is
necessarily something indigenous to the legal system. Its authority rests in
both the principle of its prior application and the need for continuity. Within
this understanding of the common law approach, even non-binding authority
is more persuasive if it is local. Local authority poses less of a challenge to the
and contextual intricacies of one system so that we can engage in meaningful comparisons. This may be
an even more serious hurdle when dealing not with the law per se but rather with the cultures of separate
legal institutions-here, the supreme courts of both countries.
256. See Beverly McLachlin, The Civilization of Difference, The Fourth Annual LaFontaine-
Baldwin Lecture, at http://www.operation-dialogue.com/lafontaine-baldwin/e/2003_speech .html
(Mar. 7, 2003).
257. 1 am grateful to Alan Brownstein for this observation.
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uniformity of the system, not to mention that in substance it may be more
responsive to local concerns, customs, and habits. The following section
explores this argument through the concepts of uniformity and legitimacy.
1. Uniformity, Certainty, and Predictability
The argument that the use of foreign law undermines the stabilizing role
of precedent is intuitively appealing. If disputes are constantly being evaluated
or re-evaluated in light of principles found in the jurisprudence of foreign
legal systems, then local law arguably becomes un-hinged from its local
context. This presents problems not only in the increased potential for the law
to be unresponsive to and unreflective of local concerns, but also because it
may undermine its formal foundations of authority. Viewed this way, the use
of foreign law is tied to concerns about increased judicial activism. In short,
the use of foreign law may be a particularly problematic instance of
irresponsible judicial behavior and judicial law-making. Does this
multiplication of sources and options lead to a crisis of accountability and
legitimacy?
One can see parallel arguments in discussions of the impact of
technology on decision-making, where it is argued that quick and easy access
to non-legal materials may lead to a decontextualization (or perhaps
recontextualization) of decision-making, thus undermining the authority and
predominance of judicial decisions.258 Whether we are talking about non-legal
information or foreign legal information, the concern is that introducing this
new variant poses problems for the coherence of the system. The very
detached and remote nature of such information risks fragmenting the core
and generating inconsistency in the law, so it is best not to even consider it
,,law." 259
One answer to this problem would be to challenge the existence of these
presumptive features of the common law: uniformity, predictability, and
certainty have always been illusory, so why worry about them now?
260
Without revisiting a century of debate on this issue, it is enough for my
present purpose to state that our perception of the common law and its
authority does indeed depend on these central notions of accountability.
Whether attainable or not, the law must appear to be neutral, constant, and
insulated from the specific normative leanings of individual judges. As
Professor Carol Greenhouse observes, "the special temporal symbolism of the
law requires a special 'kind' of person, one who will find the law, not make it;
258. For a discussion but ultimate rejection of this argument, see Richard Ross,
Communications, Revolutions and Legal Culture: An Elusive Relationship, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 632
(2002).
259. Patrick McFadden notes that two of the many reasons for the rejection of international law
in domestic courts, even when it is clearly relevant, are that it is not really law, and in any case is not
applicable. Patrick McFadden, Provincialism in United States Courts, 81 S.C. L. REv. 4, 37-38 (1995).
While these arguments are directed at international law, they are reflective of the same arguments used
to reject the use of foreign law.
260. Mauro Cappelletti argues that "judicial law-making," or judicial activism, are in fact
features of many modem legal systems. MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 148 (1989).
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know the law, but not preach it; be a representative of the national community,
but have no causes of his or her own."
261
So if we operate on the assumption that at least the appearance of
uniformity, predictability, and certainty are important within the common law,
are these norms undermined by expanding the available sources of law and by
embracing a dialogic approach to judicial reasoning?
Here we can probably draw some important lessons from work that has
been done on "legal certainty" as generated by standards or principles versus
rules. The standard positivist assumption is that precise and accurate rules lead
to greater legal certainty-and thus uniformity and predictability-whereas
more fluid, less specific directives in the form of standards or principles
generate uncertainty and inconsistency. Some recent work on legal regulation
indicates that this is not necessarily the case. Indeed the opposite holds true
when dealing with complex matters-the more general the regulatory
principles the greater the likelihood of achieving consistent, predictable
results. According to Professor John Braithwaite, there are numerous reasons
why this is the case, but in general, the matter boils down to the fact that rules
generate rule-like behavior, including the desire to find loopholes and expand
the number of rules, creating an unwieldy, confusing body of rules and
exceptions. This, not surprisingly, leads to uncertain and inconsistent
applications. Principles or loose standards, on the other hand, generate
principled and more persuasive consistent reasoning in any given area. C
While this may indeed be an accurate analysis of rules and principles in
the area of regulation, two questions remain: First, can we extend this to
judicial decision-making, and second, what does this have to do with the use
of foreign law?
Professor Braithwaite admits in his study that there are no data with
which to test his hypothesis in judicial decision-making and for this reason he
resorts to studies focusing on regulatory officials. But there is no reason to
believe that judges are significantly different from regulatory officials when it
comes to the application of rules. In both cases formalistic behavior combined
with a "bottom-up" approach-reasoning driven by basic instincts about the
best result in any given case-is more likely to generate inconsistencies in
rule application than the use of more general principles. 263 So while there is no
indication that this hypothesis holds true in judicial decision-making there are
good reasons to consider its general applicability.
With respect to the use of foreign law, I have tried to argue that this is
part of a broader approach to decision-making that encourages ongoing
discussion about legal ideas. The global dialogue, if not causally connected,
appears to be in symbiosis with the local dialogue, and together they compose
a dialogic approach. It is dialogues or conversations of this sort that Professor
261. Carol Greenhouse, Just in Time: Temporality and the Cultural Legitimation of Law, 98
YALE L.J. 1631, 1643 (1989) (emphasis added).
262. John Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty, 27 AUSTRALIAN J.
LEGAL PHIL. 47, 55-60 (2002) (basing his conclusions on a comparative study of the regulation of
nursing homes in the U.S. and Australia).
263. Id. at 64.
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Braithwaite argues assist in the creation of more certain results. Professor
Braithwaite states:
Certainty does not flow so much from objective features of the clarity and precision of
the words in rules, as lawyers sometimes assume, but from shared assumptions in a
regulatory community about the interpreted shape of a rule.
2
64
In Professor Braithwaite's analysis, the discussions or conversations that
are necessary to the creation of shared assumptions are more likely to occur
through the application of principles. And in my analysis, such discussions are
encouraged rather than defeated by embracing the influence of foreign law.
It may be the case that discussion and dialogue as sources of certainty
are indeed more important in constitutional law than in other areas. Professors
Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer argue forcefully that the "settlement
function of the law," something akin to the simpler notion of certainty, is
primarily generated through judicial supremacy.265  Professor Keith
Whittington, on the other hand, argues that this is wrong in the context of
constitutional decision-making. First, it is not clear, according to Professor
Whittington, that "settlement" is a constitutional virtue:
It is sometimes better for constitutional rules to be relatively unsettled because it can
foster socially beneficial experimentation and allow political diversity. The founders in
fact left a large number of constitutional issues unsettled, allowing for future
constitutional development rather than seeking to close it off.
2 6 6
Whittington goes on to argue that constitutions also fundamentally embody
"substantive values." Ignoring these substantive values in the interest of
finality and "settlement" seems to fly in the face of the importance of
constitutions. Thus, decisions that take seriously the balancing of
constitutional values or "incremental and ambiguous decisions leaving room
for further political negotiation" may be more appropriate, particularly on
highly complex and divisive constitutional issues.
2
Second, even accepting some positive role for "settled expectations" in
constitutional law, it is not clear that these expectations can be generated by
any one institution, let alone the judiciary. All that judicial decisions can
really expect to accomplish is to shape rather than settle the nature of legal
discourse and the resolution of future disputes.268 In this way legal decisions
are more "constitutive" than "regulative'269-terms that map well onto the
dialogic and enforcement models. Again, these limitations are more
pronounced in the area of constitutional decision-making because, as
Professor Whittington states, "the appropriate place of precedent in
264. Id. at 71 (relying on the work of Julia Black).
265. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpetation, 110
HARV. L. REv. 1359, 1371 (1997).
266. Keith Whittington, supra note 249, at 791.
267. Id. at 796.
268. Id. at 797-99.
269. Id. at 798.
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constitutional decision-making is far less resolved than proponents of judicial
supremacy suggest.
2 70
Thus, for these reasons and others relating to the nature of "extrajudicial
settlement," Professor Whittington argues that there is no reason to think that
judicial decision-making is any better at providing "settled expectations" than
extrajudicial decision-making.27 1 To this we can add Professor Friedman's
observation that in constitutional law, such settled expectations or "uniformity
has a chimerical quality, based as it is upon the assumption that U.S. Supreme
Court doctrine provides some reasonable measure of predictability and
stability. '272 The Court's jurisprudence on freedom of religion, for example,
certainly goes a long way to dispel any expectations of "predictability or
stability."
27 3
So to return to my arguments, judicial supremacy and the enforcement
model approach are not necessary to preserve certainty or the "settlement
function of the law." A dialogic/comparative approach does not undermine the
common law norms of certainty, predictability, and uniformity. Rather, this
model proceeds on the assumption that judicial reasoning alone can only ever
be marginally successful on these counts and, more importantly, that settled
expectations are more likely to occur through the persuasion that comes with
open dialogue and shared responsibility for constitutional interpretation. In
this sense, a formal notion of uniformity based on "imposition" is here
replaced with an expectation of uniformity built on "persuasion."'274 Professor
Glenn makes this point exceedingly well: "Multiplying the sources of law,
however, means multiplying the source of legal dialogue. Law is less precise
but more communal and there are more possibilities of persuasion and
adherence to law.,
275
If we hold to the view that uniformity, predictability, and certainty can
only be achieved by limiting both the sources of legal authority and the
number of participants engaged in constitutional interpretation, then of course
broadening the category of legitimate sources and engaging in a never ending
dialogue will undermine these common law norms. The point of this section
and Professor Glenn's statement, however, is to argue that the creation of a
broader community of legal knowledge through dialogue at all levels is more
likely to support rather than undermine these norms.276 This resonates with
270. Id at 801-03 (relying on the willingness of judges to "routinely flaunt the regulative
authority of precedent" in constitutional cases).
271. Id. at 802-08. It is important to recognize that this does not, in Whittington's analysis,
dictate against judicial review, just against the notion ofjudicial supremacy.
272. Friedman, supra note 84, at 130.
273. Id.
274. Glenn, Persuasive Authority, supra note 10, at 298.
275. Id at 297.
276. Related to this idea is the generally acceptable notion that finding ways to educate the
populace about constitutional norms is necessary in the creation of new constitutional regimes. This
debate often finds its way into discussions of centralized versus decentralized structures of constitutional
review. See Louis Favoreu, Constitutional Review in Europe, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE
INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 38 (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal
eds., 1990).
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what Alexander Bickel saw as the important educative function of the
Supreme Court and the role of such a function in justifying judicial review.2 7
Finally, the use of persuasion and dialogue in creating convincing,
certain, and uniform legal norms may be particularly important in democratic
societies. We can take it for granted that conversation and dialogue broadly
speaking are indispensable to democratic societies. It may also be the case, as
Professor Maimon Schwarzschild argues, that pluralism helps generate
dialogue. If this is indeed the case, there is every reason to believe that a more
pluralistic approach to judicial reasoning also encourages dialogue. To turn
this around, excessive centralization and uniformity in decision-making may,
Professor Schwarzschild argues, undercut "conversation" and thus hinder
democracy itself. 278
Surely the idea of multiple separate voices engaging in dialogue is one
of the central insights of the U.S. Constitution. As Professor Friedman writes,
"the dialogic process animates the regulating lines of relationships established
by the U.S. Constitution itself., 279 If this is the case, why should the Court shy
away from a comparable model of judicial reasoning in constitutional cases?
If the contribution of multiple perspectives is key to the stability of
constitutional democracy, can multiple voices and sources of ideas be that
much of a threat to the stability of constitutional norms in judicial reasoning?
The argument in this section has been that expanding the sources of law, thus
creating a rich dialogue around legal norms, is more likely to lead to, rather
than undercut, greater certainty in the law and a more robust democratic
society.
2. Legitimacy
Certainty is not the end of the inquiry. Justice Scalia's rejection of
foreign law relates to concerns about certainty, uniformity, and predictability.
But more than anything else, Justice Scalia is concerned with legitimacy, and
in his opinion only direct, organic, text-based, and binding rules can preserve
the Court's legitimacy. Foreign law, popular opinions, and politics are all
unacceptable sources of judicial reasoning because they reveal or implicate
personal value judgments and, as such, undermine the legitimacy of the
law.280 As mentioned earlier, Justice Scalia does not object to transnational
extra-judicial conversations so long as such "conversations" stay out of actual
decision-making. 281 And so the question remains: does the use of foreign law
pose problems for the legitimacy of a court such as the U.S. Supreme Court
or, for that matter, the Supreme Court of Canada?
277. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS 26 (1962).
278. Maimon Schwarzschild, Pluralism, Conversation, and Judicial Restraint, 95 Nw. U. L.
REv. 961, 961 (2001).
279. Friedman, supra note 84, at 115.
280. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 997-1000 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
281. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, supra note 73, at 1122 ("1 welcome international conferences...
in which the judges of various countries may exchange useful insights and information, and, by
association with their colleagues in the law, may strengthen their sense of dignity and independence.").
Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review
To begin with, it is important to note that some scholars writing about
comparative constitutional law have suggested that in some contexts, foreign
and international law are actually necessary to legitimate decision-making.
For example, it may be necessary for courts in burgeoning or transitional
democracies to resort to foreign law as a way to legitimate both the court and
its decisions. The Constitutional Court of South Africa, for example, may
need to resort to foreign law to effect a smooth transition to a new rule of law
based legal system. 28 Foreign law, in this context, can be used to legitimate
the Constitutional Court and its decisions to a skeptical international legal and
business community, not to mention a wary local population. So in the
absence of convincing or inappropriate local precedent, foreign law can
actually validate a court and its key decisions.
But the situations where foreign law is actually necessary are far
removed from the established constitutional democracies discussed in this
paper. So if outside authority is not necessary, as is clearly the case in both
Canada and the United States, are we inevitably led to the conclusion that it is
damaging, or at a minimum inappropriate, as Justice Scalia would have usbelieve? 284
A partial answer to the question of legitimacy is embedded in the
discussion in the prior section. Legitimacy in the dialogic model is presumed
to emanate from the persuasiveness of the arguments and the enhancement of
communal knowledge. So it should come as no surprise that Canadian
Supreme Court justices perceive the use of foreign law along with the
acceptance of more amicus briefs and non-legal information as boosting the
Court's legitimacy. 285 According to Justice lacobucci, such sources are
presumed to enhance the persuasiveness of the Court's decisions and thus
contribute rather than undermine the Court's legitimacy.
Besides the arguments already made in the prior section, there are other
important observations about legitimacy and the dialogic/comparative
approach, many of them suggested by Professor McCrudden's analysis of the
use of foreign law in human rights cases.286
Professor McCrudden argues that the answer to concerns about
legitimacy partially depends on the audience for any given decision. He states,
"where the view among public opinion is current that human rights are not
subject to international debate, either because of unilateralism, relativism,
282. See, e.g., McCrudden, supra note 5, at 523-24 (discussing the inclination to use foreign
law when there is an "absence of (preferred) indigenous jurisprudence" or when the constitution is
perceived to be "transformative"); Vicki Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and
Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 262 (2001) ("In some systems, a court's
reliance on, or overt consideration of, the reasoning of foreign or international bodies may strengthen the
court's claim to be autonomous and independent in the ascertainment of law, thereby increasing its
apparent legitimacy.").
283. HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH AFRICA'S
POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 162-71 (2000).
284. See also Chase, supra note 94 at 277-280 (arguing that the importation of foreign law will
undermine the legitimacy of legal systems).
285. Comments by Justice lacobucci at a seminar held at the Law School of the Australian
National University, September 13, 2002 (notes on file with author).
286. McCrudden, supra note 5, at 516-27.
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isolationism, or particularism, then reference to other foreign courts' decisions
are much less likely. ''287 And then a little later, "[w]here the audience is
sufficiently convinced that its role in the world is to lead rather than follow,
the use of other courts' approaches is also unlikely. 288
While there may be something intuitively appealing about this
"audience" perspective rationale, it presumes the court itself has little to say
about what its audience should expect. While this may be the case with
respect to courts just beginning to establish their authority, this can hardly be
said of the U.S. Supreme Court. If the question is simply what does the
audience expect, surely established courts, such as the Supreme Courts of
Canada and the United States, have some role in shaping the answer. The U.S.
Supreme Court has actively, and in some cases aggressively, participated in
defining and redefining both the scope of its authority and the expectations of
its audience since Marbury. In short, this is a two-way street. It is both
counter-intuitive and historically anomalous to imagine that the U.S. Supreme
-Court passively relies on cues from its audience for the scope of its authority
and methods of adjudication. As Professor Jackson states, "if Justices refer
more to the constitutional decisions of other courts, this practice to some
extent will become self-legitimating. 289
Professor McCrudden also remarks that being in a position of leadership
may contribute to a lack of interest in foreign law. This may be a convincing
explanation for the enforcement model but it does not address the question
posed in this Section. The fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has little interest
in foreign law may confirm that a comparative analysis is unnecessary in a
purely functional sense, but it says nothing about whether its use would
actually undermine the Court's legitimacy. To the extent that the Court has a
foreign audience and wishes to retain some legitimacy in that context, it may
indeed be important for it to pay attention to constitutional developments
elsewhere. As Justice Stevens has suggested, being in a position of leadership
may, in fact, require the Court to be more sensitive to foreign legal
developments and how its own analysis influences foreign law.290
Another question relevant to this discussion is the suitability of foreign
law in specific areas of law. It may be the case that foreign law is more useful
in one area of law but less useful in others. In those areas where it might be
more useful it could also be argued that it is unlikely to have a negative effect
on legitimacy. The increasing interest in comparative constitutionalism may
indicate greater receptivity to using foreign law here rather than in, for
example, statutory interpretation. But even within constitutional law, there are
disputes over where and when foreign authority is appropriate or useful.
287. Id. at 519.
288. Id. at 520.
289. Jackson, supra note 63, at 263.
290. United States v. Alvarez Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 687-88 (1992) ("The significance of this
Court's precedents is illustrated by a recent decision of the Court of Appeal of the Republic of South
Africa .... The Court of Appeal of South Africa-indeed, I suspect most courts throughout the civilized
world-will be deeply disturbed by the 'monstrous' decision the Court announces today. For every
nation that has an interest in preserving the Rule of Law is affected ... by a decision of this character.")
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Professor McCrudden, as previously noted, has some concerns about the use
of foreign authority when dealing with human rights, 291 and Professor Jackson
has commented on the irrelevance of foreign law to questions of federalism.
292
Constitutional provisions establishing a federalism "package" are, according
to Professor Jackson, "often peculiarly the product of political compromise in
historically situated moments, generally designed as a practical rather than a
principled accommodation of competing interests." As the products of highly
contextualized "packages," federalism issues are thus, Professor Jackson
argues, poorly suited to transnational constitutional discourse.
293
A full analysis of where and when the use of foreign law is most
appropriate and thus less likely to undermine a court's legitimacy is beyond
the scope of this Article. Many have already tackled this topic from the
perspective of utility and functionality, and so it is enough here to flag it as
part of the general concerns about legitimacy.294 One related question that
does, however, warrant further comment is whether in a more general way the
degree of contextualization of law should, as Professor Jackson suggests,
affect the introduction of a comparative analysis. In other words, if the area of
law in question is deeply contextualized and highly dependent on local
circumstances, would the introduction of a comparative analysis lead to
greater concerns about the legitimacy of the decision in question (and thus the
legitimacy of the court)?
I do not disagree with Professor Jackson's view if we restrict our
analysis to the utility of the foreign law in question. Discussion of foreign law
in the area of federalism may indeed be less useful than comparable
discussions in the area of, for example, free speech. But if foreign law, or a
comparative analysis, is used in a less determinative, more dialogic manner,
then the promise of a richer internal dialogue lessens concerns about utility
and relevance. In other words, the point of this Article has been to broaden the
scope of analysis on the use of foreign law, to understand the larger context of
decision-making in which the use of foreign law is just a piece, and through
such larger context to determine whether connected concerns about
legitimacy, certainty, coherence, and utility are valid. I have argued that
tapping into a more global pool of legal reasoning may enrich rather than
overwhelm dialogue and discussion at the local level, thus minimizing
concerns about the usefulness of comparative analysis in specific areas of law.
Concerns about uniformity and legitimacy are important when
considering the use of a comparative analysis in judicial reasoning. But to
assume that foreign material will always create such problems is to ignore the
persuasive component of judicial reasoning as well as the influence of high
courts on questions of relevancy. More importantly, such an assumption is
based on the conclusion that foreign law is inherently inapposite. Not only
291. McCrudden, supra note 5, at 529-32.
292. Although, interestingly, human rights and federalism are two of the few areas of law in
which the U.S. Supreme Court has discussed the value of foreign law and engaged in some comparative
reasoning.
293. Jackson, supra note 63, at 272-274.
294. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1265-69.
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does this seem incapable of proof as a broad ranging rule, it also ignores the
complexity of comparative analysis and its place in a discursive model of
decision-making.
B. Globalization and Local Legal Culture
I began this Section by asking whether there is anything to be gained or
lost from a comparative/dialogic approach to decision-making, and I went on
to discuss this from the perspective of existing common law norms-concerns
about certainty and legitimacy. However, there is another perhaps more
interesting approach to this question that takes us away from specific, internal
legal norms towards an external view of legal systems. If law and individual
legal systems can be understood as having distinct local identities with
identifiable authentic experiences, what happens when such experiences are
continually exposed to external influences? Put another way, if law has a
dynamic relationship with local culture, then do we risk a "feeling of lost
authenticity . . . ruining some essence or source' '295 in the process of
globalizing legal analysis?
To translate this more specifically into the topic at hand, the trend in
U.S. jurisprudence has been to keep as firm a grip on an authentic legal
experience as possible. This is evident in all aspects of the enforcement
model-the resistance to foreign law, the insistence on exclusive authority,
and the originalist and textualist interpretive methodologies preferred by those
who most strongly endorse this model. The enforcement model tends to
enshrine the past, marking it as the source of principled, definitive, and
closely tailored legal norms. Not only does this legal past hold out the promise
of virtue and integrity in legal reasoning-for the past always has at least
precedent on its side 296 -it also can be cast as a uniquely local experience.
While this claim is problematized in Constitutional law by the influence of
non-American thinkers on the drafting of the Constitution, it has some
credibility given the unique history of American constitutional law. With such
a unique and culturally contingent experience, perhaps there is something to
the fear of "ruining some essence or source" of American constitutional law in
the introduction of comparative analysis in decision-making.
This concern raises an entirely different set of issues, in particular the
relationship between law and culture and the evolution of legal systems-
issues that require more elaboration than is possible here. But I do want to
address two discrete issues that at least scratch the surface of this concern
about authenticity.
First, if the notion of "dialogue" or the idea of a global legal analysis
requires an acceptance of the shifting and fluid meanings of law, then can any
one legal principle or idea ever command the authority that is so necessary to
the rule of law? We might consider this the relativism objection, but this, as I
already tried to argue in the prior Section, mistakes the nature of legal process.
It operates not exclusively on the foundation of a defined and bounded set of
295. JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE 4 (1988).
296. See Anthony Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990).
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practices, but rather on its ability to adjust and accommodate, and yet remain
in some sense constant. Reconciliation, rationalization, and persuasion are at
the heart of this process, not authenticity. Professor Glenn makes a similar
argument in his discussion of the interdependency of complex legal systems:
"[I]f all of its elements are constantly engaged with one another-in
conversation, dialogue or argument-then there is no place for the indecision
of relativism."
297
So if relativism is not a concern, what about universalism, the second
globalism trap? Through a dialogic/comparative model of judicial reasoning
do we risk going in the opposite direction? If we give up grasping for an
authentic local legal experience, do we necessarily give ourselves up to the
notion of a unitary legal system founded on universal legal principles? Is the
"organicism" so central to the enforcement model eliminated by globalism
and dialogue in legal analysis?
While globalism and the ease of transnational legal communication may
give greater immediacy to these issues, Professor Glenn argues that the
strength of highly distinct legal traditions has always depended upon
connections, diversity and what he terms "multivalence":
The multivalence of major, complex legal traditions, and the interdependence between
them, has necessary consequences for their ongoing survival .... Multivalence allows
for movement within the tradition itself, such that disaffection in one of its branches does
not imply exit on the part of those disaffected, or an overall loss in adherence to the major
tradition. It is the advantage of the big tent.
298
Diversity both within and between legal systems is thus in Professor Glenn's
analysis "perhaps inevitable or natural." And yet in his careful prediction of
the next obvious question, he argues there are benefits to actively sustaining
diversity rather than ignoring or even attempting to stifle it in the interest of
authenticity. The robustness of one's own tradition becomes dependent on
recognition of the mutual interdependence of all systems. Globalization is not,
in this sense, a one-way process of universalization, globalization is the
"universalization of particularism and the particularization of
universalism."
299
So, in an odd sort of way, we are back at the local. One of the
unintended consequences of a global/dialogic approach to legal reasoning may
in fact be the encouragement of a local interpretive legal process. Such a
process is not local in the sense that it constantly seeks to restrict and limit
analysis to only those legal traditions and ideas that have a discernible local
pedigree but rather local in the sense that it is communal and participatory. It
is local because local legal actors are viewed as legitimate and active
participants in the constant redefinition of law. Thus organicism and
globalism in legal interpretation may not be dichotomous but rather intricately
connected through a process-oriented or discursive understanding of law.3°0
297. GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS, supra note 10, at 329.
298. ld. at 331.
299. Roland Robertson, Social Theory, Cultural Relativity and the Problem of Globality, in
CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION AND THE WORLD-SYSTEM 69, 77 (Anthony D. King ed., 1997).
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It is important not to overstate this argument. Recognition of mutual
interdependence does not necessarily require the same sort of active pursuit of
transnational judicial dialogue that is evident in the Canadian model.
Additionally, if we follow Professor Glenn's argument, the focused decision-
making of the enforcement model is no doubt not as insular and independent
as those who support it might imagine. But the real object of this Section has
been to argue that fears inherent in a rejection of the dialogic model are
simply unfounded. Dialogue, diversity, and even ambiguity are not indications
or harbingers of a weakening system but rather the foundation of a distinctive
and stable legal identity.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no reason to believe that highly distinct legal systems are
somehow impervious to external influences-whether overt, as in the case of
comparative decision-making--or discrete. Professor Glenn writes, "[tihe
better notion seems to be one of interdependence, or of nonseparation, and this
emerges as the most fundamental idea in the existence of major, complex,
legal traditions. ' 0° While this is an observation of the unintended nature of
law and legal systems, this paper has attempted to explore what happens when
this interdependence is intentional, specifically in the context of constitutional
decision-making.
Most of the constitutional scholars who have commented on the use of
foreign law or comparative judicial reasoning focus on functional questions-
when and how foreign law should be used and what its limitations are. What I
have attempted to do in this paper is look at comparative judicial reasoning in
a broader context. I have constructed models of judicial review that relate to
the rejection or acceptance of comparative analysis and then used these
models to examine concerns associated with the use of comparative judicial
reasoning.
There is nothing immanent or inevitable or universal about these
models-there is no necessary connection between comparative judicial
reasoning and the dialogic model or between a rejection of comparative
reasoning and the enforcement model. But the dialogic model tells us that
there is also no necessary connection between an exclusive focus on local
legal analysis and the production or preservation of local legal authority, at
'least in the context of constitutional law. Comparative analysis neither
undermines local authority nor disconnects legal analysis from its local origins
when encompassed in a larger dialogic model. Rather it holds out the promise
that courts can move beyond enforcement and fully engage in the
"reconciliation of differences." 30 2
devoted to understanding the relationship between culture in its local and global contexts or at the
political level between nationalism and globalism. See, e.g., Saskia Sassen, Spatialities and
Temporalities of the Global: Elements for a Theorization, in GLOBALIZATION 260 (Arjun Appadurai ed.,
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